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The evolution of the Yugoslav policy of nonalignment.

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE YUGOSLAV
POLICY OF NONALIGNMENT

A thesis Presented

By

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE YUGOSLAV
POLICY OF NONALIGNMENT

A Thesis

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INTRODUCTION

The policy of nonalignment has been an active force in international relations for over twenty years. It found acceptance among a wide range of nations with differing political and ideological outlooks. However, they did share an aversion to big power politics and a desire to be more than a mere pawn in the struggle for "influence" by the super powers. The majority of these countries were of the so called Third World, that vast area encompassing Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Despite a wide divergence in history and culture, they share one dominant characteristic in the present era; that is, a depressing level of poverty and economic underdevelopment.

Rather incongruously, one of the leaders of this movement was Yugoslavia, a white European state and rather rich compared to the states of the Third World. How Yugoslavia came to join and lead the ranks of the nonaligned is one of the chief concerns of this paper. Yugoslavia was and is a communist state led by men who have devoted their entire lives to that cause. Thus, their expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 was a severe psychological blow. The Yugoslav leadership literally did not know which way to turn. It was in this period that Yugoslavia came closest to actually joining the West.

However, the international system was being shaped by two new forces at this time. The first was the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States which cast the world into a bipolar shape for over twenty years. The second significant event was the disintegration of colonialism which proceeded at an amazing pace in the post World War II years. Many of these new states joined the fledgling movement of nonalignment. The successes and failures of this international movement is one focus of this paper.

Yugoslavia came to know the movement through association with several of these states chiefly at the United Nations. Yugoslavia joined the movement because it seemed to answer many of the problems Yugoslavia faced in the foreign policy field. She also joined for several purely domestic reasons which, surprisingly, paralleled those of the new Third World states. The success or failure of nonalignment as a foreign policy for Yugoslavia is also a central concern of this paper.

Finally, we will discuss the future of nonalignment, both as an international movement and as a foreign policy for Yugoslavia. Nonalignment was a response to an international system largely shaped by two major forces growing out of World War II and its aftermath. A central question then is whether or not the international system has changed

and, if so, is the policy of nonalignment relevant now
and in the foreseeable future.



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CHAPTER 1

THE BREAK WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Yugoslavia was the first country to consciously and successfully conduct a foreign policy outside of the domination of either the Soviet or American blocs. This radical new policy did not come about over night. In fact, the policy of nonalignment came about only after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the international communist community in June of 1948. This was the single most important event in the development of its policy of nonalignment. However, Yugoslavia could very easily have turned completely to the West and even become a member of NATO. Indeed, there were tendencies in that very direction. In order to understand why Yugoslavia turned to an active policy of nonalignment instead, one must understand the nature of the Yugoslav leadership and the background of the historic break with the Soviet Union.

Spurred by the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, various socialist organizations convened in Belgrade on April 19, 1919 and formed the Socialist Workers Party of Yugoslavia (Communist). In the election of 1920, the new party won 58 seats out of 419 in the Constituent Assembly. It was the third largest party at the time. However, its greatest success came in Montenegro and Macedonia,

the most backward regions of the new state. After several unsuccessful attempts at violence and the successful assassination of the Interior Minister, Milorad Draskovic, the new Party was outlawed in August of 1921.

The Party fell into an eclipse for several reasons other than its illegal status. One reason was the extreme fragmentation of the infant Party. The Second Party Congress in Vukovar on June 15, 1920 did much to cause this fragmentation. At this Congress, the Party changed its name to that of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and adopted a policy of complete submission to the Comintern, the international communist agency. A small group of independents rebelled at this and wanted autonomy for every member of the Third International. This small group was purged for its effort, but its ideas were to see success twenty-eight years later.

The other cause of the Party's factionalism was, as always in Yugoslavia, the nationality question. The Comintern leaders and Stalin himself felt that the ethnic antagonisms should be exploited by the Party for the sake of the eventual revolution. The leader of the Yugoslav Party at this time was one Sima Markovich, alias Semich. He was unwilling to grant the right of secession to non-Serb minorities and felt that any such appeal was non-Marxist. He felt that the nationalities question was a constitutional one. The Comintern stressed that although Semich was correct in

his interpretation of Marx, the nationality question was one of tactics and not ideology. Semich dared to put his interpretation of Marx ahead of that of Moscow's. This theme will reappear in 1948.¹

In 1928, the leader of the Zagreb branch of the CPY, Josip Broz, later to be known as Tito, went over the heads of the Yugoslav leadership and sent an appeal to the Comintern to take the Yugoslav Party in hand and to end this factional strife. This letter was well received in Moscow and at the Fourth Congress of the CPY in Dresden in 1928, the Third International did just that. Semich was forced to resign and a new leadership was installed, headed by Djuro Djakovich and including Tito. In addition, the tactics of the Party were changed to take advantage of the ethnic divisions in Yugoslavia. This tactic was dutifully followed upon the Party's return to Yugoslavia. They tried to outbid nearly every extreme nationalist group in an attempt to win followers. They called for the secession and independence of nearly every ethnic minority in the country. These attempts could only lead to failure and the Party's popularity declined further. In 1932, a new leader, Milan Gorkich, was chosen but the Party's decline continued. In 1936, the entire Central Committee of the CPY was summoned to

¹Adam B. Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 1-14.

Moscow and, as was the custom in Moscow at the time, purged of its incorrect members. In addition, the Party did an about face and proclaimed that ethnic separation was no longer the policy of the Party. This no doubt reflected the Soviet need for potential allies in a possible conflict with Hitler's Germany. In 1937, Tito was designated by Moscow as the new Secretary General.²

Tito must have appeared to be the ideal subservient leader to the Russians at this time. Josip Broz was born in the village of Kumrovec in Croatia on May 7, 1892. He was apprenticed as a locksmith and received his certificate in September of 1910 and joined the Metal Workers' Union the following month. He practiced his trade until his conscription in 1913 at the age of twenty-one into the Austro-Hungarian Army. During the subsequent war, Tito, an NCO, was wounded and captured by the Russians on March 25, 1915. He spent the next five years roaming the Russian countryside and waiting out the war in various Russian jails. After being freed at the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution, he fought as a Red Guard for some time. He officially joined the Communist Party while in Omsk on January 19, 1919. On the following January he married a Russian girl, Pelagea Belousova, and returned home shortly thereafter. He began active Party work in 1923 and soon found himself in prison in 1928 after he wrote his letter to Moscow. He emerged

²Ibid., pp. 14-22.

from prison five years later and soon moved up in Party rank. He was chosen Secretary General of the Yugoslav Party by the Russians because of his close ties with Russia, his demonstrated subservience to Moscow, and his proletarian, non-intellectual background.³

In the period from 1937 to 1941, the CPY under Tito's leadership laid the grounds for its eventual success. Operating from within Yugoslavia, Tito and his followers built up an experienced, trained, and above all united band of cadres. The new tactic of appealing to all Yugoslavs met with some success. Many intellectuals and others were tired of the incessant ethnic strife. The Party also capitalized on the strong anti-Hitler feeling prevalent in Yugoslavia. This appeal was of course limited by the treaty between Germany and Russia in 1939. Tito did, however, build up a personal following and installed his close supporters such as Edward Kardelj, Alex Rankovic, and Milovan Djilas into positions of power.⁴

The advent of the Second World War in Yugoslavia gave Tito and the Communists the chance they had been waiting for. The Yugoslav government of Prince-Regent Paul signed an agreement on March 25, 1941 allowing the Germans to cross Yugoslavia on their way to Greece. The Yugoslav

³Phyllis Auty, Tito: A Biography (London: Longman Group Limited, 1970), pp. 3-57.

⁴Ulam, Titolsm, pp. 22-26.

government was overthrown two days later by General Simovich and King Peter was installed as the King in an anti-Nazi regime. The Germans invaded on April 6 and the new Yugoslav regime was quickly overrun. The country was governed by Germany and Italy and various puppet states were created. The attitude of the Communists was somewhat ambivalent until the attack on Russia by Germany on June 21, 1941. The Yugoslav Communists then became fierce defenders of their "country".⁵

The first resistance to the Germans was by the Chetniks, a para-military pro-Serbian organization under the leadership of General Mihailovich. The Communists then organized their resistance and took the name of Partisans. The Communists played down ideology and accentuated Yugoslav nationalism. While remaining in control, the Communists were willing to accept people of all political persuasions into their anti-German movement. They were also willing to accept people of all ethnic backgrounds. In contrast, the Chetniks were almost completely Serbian. Soon, three overlapping wars were going on at once; a war of resistance by both groups against the Germans and their puppets, a civil war between the Chetniks and the Partisans, and a general blood bath between the Serbs and the Croats that had religious overtones. The Chetniks were either unable or unwilling, because of atrocious German recriminations

⁵George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), pp. 69-81.

against the civilian population, to mount an effective resistance. The Partisans were much more effective and consequently increased in membership from 80, 000 in 1941 to 800,000 in 1944. Britain and the United States recognized the royal government in exile but aided the Partisans for military reasons. The British were the first to aid the Partisans in May of 1943. In contrast, the Russians didn't send aid until February of 1944. The Russians feared alienating the allies. The Red Army entered Yugoslavia in the Fall of 1944 with an agreement to leave as soon as possible. On October 20, 1944 the Partisans and the Red Army liberated Belgrade and the War was over for Yugoslavia.⁶

During the War, the Communists remained in control of the Partisan movement through the device of various front organizations. In November of 1942, they created the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia or AVNOJ. In 1943 a National Liberation Committee was established as a provisional government in Partisan controlled areas. Tito was of course President, but the Committee contained a few non-Communists as well. In June of 1944, Premier Subasic of the Royal Government signed an agreement with Tito. The subsequent elections were single slate elections organized by the Communist dominated Popular Front. As a result, the Popular Front received 90.8 per cent of the vote. A Constitutional Assembly met on November 29, 1945 and denounced the monarchy and proclaimed the

⁶Ibid., pp. 69-81.

People's Republic of Yugoslavia. A new Stalinist Constitution was put into effect on January 30, 1946.⁷

The Partisans succeeded because of their better organization and the higher quality of their political and military leadership. Also, the unique conditions in Yugoslavia allowed them to wage a war against occupation and a domestic revolution at the same time.

There were many factors that promoted and continue to promote a close relationship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. First and foremost is the fact that they are both communist states dominated by their respective communist parties. This meant, at least before 1948, the domination of the CPSU by definition. One of Stalin's main contributions to Marxist theory was the idea of "socialism in one country." This meant that the main function of the international communist movement is the perpetuation and strengthening of the only successful socialist revolution, that of the Soviet Union. Any divergence from this view was looked on as petty bourgeois nationalism. Thus Kardelj could say in 1945 that he wanted the "Soviet Union to look at us as one of the future Soviet Republics, and not as representatives of another country, capable of independently solving questions."⁸

⁷Ibid., pp. 69-81.

⁸Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 39.

We have seen that the actual organization of the Yugoslav Communist Party was determined by the Soviet leaders. As early as the Fourth Party Congress in 1928, the CPY was completely under the influence of the Third International led by the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav Party dutifully followed every twist and turn in tactics and strategy as dictated by the Soviet Union. Tito, Kardelj, and others had spent considerable time in the Soviet Union. Also, at least before the War, Tito and others owed their position in the Party to the support of the CPSU.

Yugoslav relations had gotten progressively worse with the West. This was because of their Marxist domestic programs and their militancy in foreign affairs. In 1946, they shot down two United States' planes flying over their territory. They were giving much support to the Greek Communists in their Civil War. They were at odds with the West on the question of Trieste. In view of these difficulties, the Yugoslavs looked upon the Soviets as their protector in case of an invasion by the West.

Still, the greatest tie between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was their mutual devotion to the principles of Marxist-Leninism. As Djilas puts it, "For the Yugoslavs, Moscow was not only a political and spiritual center but the realization of an abstract ideal-the 'classless society'-something that not only made their sacrifice and suffering easy and sweet, but that justified their very existence in

their own eyes."⁹ This feeling extended to the Soviet leadership as well. "The Yugoslav Communist Party was not only as ideologically unified as the Soviet, but faithfulness to Soviet leadership was one of the essential elements of its development and activity. Stalin was not only the undisputed leader of genius, he was the incarnation of the very idea and dream of the new society."¹⁰ The Yugoslavs and other East European Communists were so committed to the idea of communism that the Soviet Union became perfect in their eyes. The idea that Russian national interest and Yugoslav national interest might differ on occasion was simply impossible.

Less important, but still a factor was the historic tie between Yugoslavs and Russians as Slavic people. The Russians, as Orthodox Christians, had long been a protector of the Orthodox Christians of Serbia and Montenegro. The Russian defeat of Turkey in 1878 gave Serbia her full independence. The Yugoslav Communists, although admitting to exploiting Slavic solidarity, realized that Marxist-Leninism was the all important idea. During the Second World War, Moscow created a Pan Slavic Committee to tie the Slavic people together. Djilas describes this as a "matter of resurrecting something long since outmoded, a transitional

⁹Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1962), p. 11.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 14.

form meant to rally support around Communist Russia, or at least to paralyze anti-Soviet Panslavic currents."¹¹

Another factor holding Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union together were the economic ties forged between the two countries after the War. By 1947, the Soviet Union and its satellites provided Yugoslavia with 51.8 per cent of its imported goods and in turn received 49.1 per cent of Yugoslav exports. However, this was somewhat artificial as post-48 events were to show. In fact, before 1938 66 per cent of Yugoslav trade was with the West. Due to geographic and economic factors, Yugoslavia's natural trade outlets are to Italy, West Germany, and Western Europe as a whole. However, Yugoslavia does have an interest in keeping trade ties with the countries of East Europe and the Soviet Union.¹²

Yugoslavia was expelled from the international Communist movement by a communique from the Cominform on June 28, 1948. This action caught the West by almost complete surprise but it had really been building since the beginning of the year and, in fact, had its roots in the very nature of the Yugoslav Communist movement.

Djilas had left for Moscow on January 8, 1948 to settle differences between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia on the question of Albania. At their meeting, Stalin said that

¹¹Ibid., p. 25.

¹²M. George Zaminovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 60-68.

it was all right if Yugoslavia 'swallowed' Albania. Throughout the meeting, it was apparent to Djilas that he was being recruited by the Soviets against Tito. As Djilas waited in Moscow, the Soviets sent for Tito. Wisely, he sent Kardelj and Bakaric in his place. At a meeting on February 10, 1948 with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations, the Soviets charged the Yugoslavs with several errors. These included: the sending of two Yugoslav divisions into Albania, the signing of a trade agreement with Bulgaria, and non-cooperation with Soviet military and economic officials. The crux of the matter was that the Yugoslavs were not consulting with Moscow before making decisions. At one point Stalin screamed at Kardelj, "You don't consult at all, that is not your mistake, but your policy-yes, your policy!"¹³ At the close of the meeting, Stalin ordered an immediate federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

After the return of the Yugoslav delegation, the Central Committee of the CPY met and opposed a federation with Bulgaria. This was reported to the Soviets by S. Zhujovich, a member of the Central Committee. The Soviets then withdrew their military and economic advisors on March 18th and 19th respectively. A series of correspondence, since made public, then followed. The Yugoslavs, in a letter dated March 20, denied that Soviet advisors were "surrounded by a sea of hostility" as had been claimed by the

¹³Djilas, Conversations With Stalin, p. 180.

Soviets. Tito did state that Soviet officials should go to the Central Committee of the CPY for information and not to lesser officials. Tito states that the Soviets have been misinformed and ends with a desire to resolve all differences.

In a reply on March 27, the Soviets raised the level of their criticism. They said that the Soviet advisors had been repeatedly abused and spied upon in Yugoslavia. They also brought up the old statement attributed to Djilas at a Central Committee meeting in 1945. He reportedly said that Soviet officers were, from a moral standpoint, inferior to the officers of the British army. This statement had been repeatedly denied before, but it does show that there was widespread Yugoslav protests over Soviet behavior during the War, specifically 121 documented rapes. The Soviets also complained about certain slanders of the Soviet Union reportedly made by leading Yugoslav Communists. The haughty attitude of the Soviets can be demonstrated by this statement. "It was naturally laughable to hear such statements about the CPSU from such questionable Marxists as Djilas, Vukmanovic, Kidric, Rankovic and others."¹⁴ These slanders were compared to those made by Trotsky at an earlier date. A further criticism was that the CPY lacked internal democracy and that the CPY was not organized along Marxist-Leninist principles. The Soviets also felt that the

¹⁴Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, eds., The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958: A Documentary Record (New York: Prospect Books, 1959), p. 10.

class struggle was not being intensified in the countryside and this was reminiscent of the "right opposition" of Bukharin. The letter ended with the charge that the Assistant Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, Velebit, was an English spy. Accordingly, the Soviet Union felt disposed to limit its correspondence with Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslavs replied on April 13, 1948. They were still conciliatory. They denied slandering the Soviet Union and that there was indeed democracy in the CPY. However, the Yugoslavs then went a step further by saying that the Soviet Ambassador, Lavrentiev, had no special right to information about the CPY. In response to the criticism of internal conditions in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs made a statement that had many ramifications for Yugoslavia and communism as a whole. They said, "On the contrary, we study and take as an example the Soviet system, but we are developing Socialism in our country in somewhat different forms."¹⁵ The Yugoslavs did complain about the Soviet practice of recruiting citizens of Yugoslavia as Soviet agents. The letter ends with an invitation to the Central Committee of the CPSU to send one or more representatives to Yugoslavia to iron out their differences.

The Soviets replied on May 4 and denied any espionage activities in Yugoslavia. The letter reiterated the main charges against Yugoslavia. The Soviets took exception to

¹⁵Ibid., p. 20.

Tito's statement that the activities of the CPY were of no special concern to the Soviet Ambassador. They said this statement was anti-Soviet and equated the Soviet Ambassador with those of Western imperialist states. The Yugoslav leadership was accused of arrogance and failure to respond to criticism. The good relations the Soviet Union maintained with the other People's Democracies of Eastern Europe were contrasted with the poor relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The letter also reveals that the dispute had been disclosed to the CP's of the Cominform countries and that it would be discussed at the forthcoming Cominform meeting.

In two subsequent letters on May 17 and 20, the Yugoslavs refused to attend the upcoming Cominform meeting. The Soviets in turn charged that the Yugoslavs evidently considered themselves above the authority of the Cominform. The Soviets regarded this decision as evidence of their guilt.

The Cominform Resolution of June 28, 1948 in effect ousts the CPY from the united communist front and the Cominform. The Resolution summarizes the charges made previously by the Soviet Union. They may be stated as follows:

1. A deviationist domestic and foreign policy;
2. Determined hostility toward the Soviet Union;
3. A faulty agricultural policy;
4. A non-Marxist-Leninist conception of the role of the party;
5. Refusal to accept criticism;

6. Arrogant behavior toward fraternal parties and claims to privilege.¹⁶

The Resolution ends with a frank call to the Yugoslav rank and file to overthrow their leadership.

In addition to these public grievances, there were other sources of disagreement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. One of the chief points of disagreement was the Soviet intention of exploiting the Yugoslav economy. As in other East European countries, the Soviets sought to establish joint stock companies with the Yugoslavs. The basic Soviet intention was to keep Yugoslavia an agricultural and raw materials producing country. In contrast to other East European countries, only two joint stock companies were set up in Yugoslavia. These were JUSTA, in civil aviation, and JUSPAD, in shipping. Through a variety of devices the Soviets clearly dominated these joint stock companies to the disadvantage of the Yugoslavs. For example, the Soviets overestimated their share by using 1946-47 prices for estimating their stock. These prices were very high compared to the 1938 prices which the Yugoslav stock was estimated at. The Soviets then didn't have to invest as much as the Yugoslavs. In addition, the Director General of these joint companies had always to be a Soviet citizen. The Yugoslavs naturally objected to these companies and to the prospect of future ones. The last straw was a

¹⁶Ibid., p. 40.

Soviet proposal for a joint national bank which would have put the Soviets in control of a significant part of Yugoslav trade. When the Yugoslavs objected, the Soviets regarded this as an hostile act. The significant fact is that the Yugoslavs were able to avoid more exploitation only because they had achieved their revolution by themselves. The other East European countries had no such protection and were exploited to a far greater degree.¹⁷

There were many foreign policy disputed between the two communist states also. We have already spoken of the Soviet disagreement with the Yugoslavs over their activity in Albania. In addition, the Yugoslavs actively supported the Greek Communists in their civil war but were told to stop by Stalin in 1948. More important for the Yugoslavs was the Soviet refusal to support them in their bid for the city of Trieste. The Soviets apparently bowed to allied pressure and agreed that Trieste should be part of Italy.

The Soviet charges and the Yugoslav countercharges were symptoms of a deeper problem inherent in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The fundamental reason for the split was that the Yugoslavs, unlike any other Communist country of Eastern Europe, excluding Albania, gained power and carried out a revolution largely without the aid of the Soviet Union and specifically the Red Army. The Soviet Union

¹⁷Vladimir Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), pp. 73-97.

refused to recognize the nature of the Yugoslav Revolution and treated Yugoslavia as a People's Democracy similar to other East European countries. The Yugoslavs saw themselves as a genuine communist regime and far ahead of the other East European countries. It was this fundamental contradiction that caused the Yugoslav break with the Soviet Union. On a personal level, of course, this meant that the Yugoslav leadership owed their positions of power to their own efforts in Yugoslavia and not to the Red Army. The question was simply who was going to control Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs or the Russian.¹⁸

The problem was not that the Yugoslavs were not Marxist as charged by the Soviets. If anything, reminiscent of Semich, the Yugoslavs followed a more Stalinist and Marxist policy than any other East European country. The policy of a different path to socialism is quite consistent with Leninism. Politically, the Yugoslavs consolidated their position much earlier than other East European countries. General Mihailovic, the Chetnik leader, was executed on July 17, 1946. On October 11, 1946 Archbishop Stepinac was sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment. Communist Party membership was increased from 140,000 in 1945 to 448,175 in 1948. In addition, the Communist controlled Popular Front organization was increased to a membership of seven million by 1948. Unlike other satellite countries in Eastern Europe,

¹⁸Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, pp. 37-40.

the Yugoslavs unabashedly called themselves Communist. They openly proclaimed themselves a "dictatorship of the proletariat" while the satellite states were known as People's Democracies. The satellite states made concessions to progressive elements and social democrats. The first Yugoslav election in 1945 was a single list election while other Communist Parties in Eastern Europe had to form coalitions and work behind front organizations. The new Yugoslav Constitution of January 30, 1946 was modeled directly after the 1936 Soviet Constitution even as to its federal structure.¹⁹

Economically, the Yugoslavs were well in advance of the other East European countries as far as Marxism was concerned. The economy was highly centralized right after the War and economic planning was begun almost immediately. The first five year plan was promulgated in 1947 and called for rapid industrialization on the Soviet model. Andrya Hebrang, later purged as a Soviet spy, was in charge of this first five year plan. The Soviets were quite critical of this plan for being very unrealistic. They were correct. Wildly optimistic, it failed miserably but was undoubtedly Marxist. Forced collectivization of agriculture was carried out right after the War with the predictable bad results. For these economic and political reasons, the Yugoslavs righteously felt on an equal footing with the Soviets as

¹⁹Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 81-113.

far as demonstrated devotion to Marxism was concerned, and the failure of the Soviets to accept this objective change in Yugoslav conditions was one of the prime reasons for the resultant split.

The Soviet Union under Stalin failed to support revolutions that were out of their direct control. This was true for the Spanish Revolution, the Yugoslav Revolution, and the Chinese Revolution. Stalin felt that the creation of revolutionary centers outside the Soviet Union would endanger Soviet supremacy in world communism. He was right, of course. Stalin subjected the views and policies of the CPSU to those of his own. The CPSU was, by definition, the leading force in the Soviet Union. By simple extension, the leading force in the communist world had to be the Soviet Union with the dictator Stalin at its head. In Djilas' words, "He became himself the slave of the despotism, the bureaucracy, the narrowness, and the servility that he imposed on his country."²⁰

²⁰Djilas, Conversations, p. 132.

CHAPTER 11

THE UNCERTAIN YEARS

For a period of time, the Yugoslavs acted as if their ouster from the Cominform was a minor quarrel and merely a case of misunderstanding. It is important to remember that basically the Yugoslavs did not break away from the Soviet bloc, but were cast away over their protests. This excommunication dealt a severe psychological and spiritual blow to the Party membership. The Yugoslav leadership was either unwilling or unable to realize the extent of their excommunication. For example, at the Fifth Party Congress on July 21, 1948 Tito ended an eight hour speech with the words, "Long live the Soviet Union, long live Stalin." In the following January, Yugoslavia dutifully applied for membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Aid and the Yugoslav leaders seemed puzzled and hurt when rebuffed. However, by the summer of 1949 in the face of increasingly strident denunciations, border clashes, and an economic blockade, Tito moved to consolidate his position. All known Soviet sympathizers were arrested and questioned. Arrests were to number over 14,000 by the end of 1952. Actually, Stalin's denunciations probably made Tito more popular at home than he had ever been as Yugoslav nationalism rose to his defence.²¹

²¹Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 141-142.

In the long run, Yugoslavia maintained its independence from the Soviet Union because of three factors: economic and military aid from the West, economic and political reforms at home, and a new constructive foreign policy.

Once the Yugoslavs got over their initial shock, they realized their situation was very precarious. Their economy suffered badly from the economic blockade imposed by the Cominform. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had supplied over 55 per cent of Yugoslavia's trade and the credit and loans necessary to implement the five year plan. Reluctantly, the Yugoslavs scrapped the plan which would not have succeeded in any case. The Yugoslavs now turned to the West for aid. In November 1948, Yugoslavia applied for aid from the United Nations. By 1950, Yugoslavia had received loans and credits from the World Bank (\$8 million), the Export-Import Bank (\$25 million), and the British treasury (\$8 million). In 1950, the United States released some \$47 million worth of Yugoslav gold reserves it had been holding since the war. In December 1950, through the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Act, the United States provided some \$50 million worth of food supplies to the beleaguered Yugoslavs. During the following ten years, Yugoslavia received from the United States \$2,396,900,000 in aid of various kinds for economic and military assistance. Britain supplied \$120,400,000 also. This aid allowed Yugoslavia to continue to exist and more important, it precipitated a series of economic reforms.²²

²²Phyllis Auty, "Yugoslavia's International Relations," in Contemporary Yugoslavia, ed. by Wayne S. Vucinich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 167-172.

Seeing that collaboration with the West did not harm them, the Yugoslavs took a harder look at the Soviet model of development. The chief weaknesses of the Soviet system seemed to be overcentralization and a stifling bureaucracy. Accordingly, they reversed these trends in Yugoslavia. Local Workers' Councils were established in July of 1950 in order to decentralize the economic structure. Similarly, forced collectivization was abandoned in March of 1953. These reforms have continued until today Yugoslavia makes much use of the market principle while retaining a loosely controlled central plan.²³

In the political realm, the Party changed its name to that of the League of Yugoslav Communists in 1952 at the Sixth Party Congress. The name signifies a higher state of development for the Party. While remaining a one party state, there has been an increase in internal party democracy. There has also been an increase in civil liberties, the case of Djilas notwithstanding. Yugoslavia has striven for greater participation in political life of the country by a law prohibiting succession to the same office.

However, what concerns us here is the impact on Yugoslav foreign policy. The break with the Soviet Union and the extension of Western aid with little or no strings attached caused Yugoslavia to rethink her foreign policy as well as her economic policy. The Yugoslavs still regarded

²³Zaminovich, The Development of Yugoslavia, pp. 73-91.

the West with their old doctrinaire hostility and suspicion. However, an important fact pushing Yugoslavia toward the West was the actions of the Soviet Union and the satellite states. In 1949 and 1950 the Soviet bloc conducted military exercises and massed troops on Yugoslavia's border. These moves were threatening in themselves but then came the North Korean attack on South Korea in June of 1950. This attack, the Yugoslavs reasoned, could only have occurred with Soviet concurrence if not pressure. Did this signal a similiar attack on Yugoslavia by the Soviet bloc? Many observers both in Yugoslavia and the West thought so, even though Yugoslavia had Europe's largest army behind the Soviet Union with 350,000 men comprising 32 divisions. Accordingly, they made arrangements with the United States for military supplies and training. However, military aid from the United States did not come as easily as economic aid. Military aid required the signing of a bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Program and the acceptance of a United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Yugoslavia. This was done after relatively easy negotiations and military aid began on a formal basis on November 14, 1951. Over the next ten years military aid was to total \$693,900,000.²⁴

Whether or not the Soviet Union contemplated an armed attack against Yugoslavia is not known. Surely it must have

²⁴John C. Campbell, Tito's Separate Road (New York: Harper & Roe, 1967), pp. 22-27.

crossed Stalin's mind. Stalin's own egoism seems to be one of the reasons that Yugoslavia was not attacked. Stalin felt that only a word from him would be enough to topple Tito. Khrushchev, in his secret speech in 1956 at the Twentieth Party Congress, reported Stalin as saying, "I will shake my little finger-and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."²⁵ By the time Stalin realized this would not happen, Tito had consolidated his position at home and had received military aid from the West. Stalin was not about to risk a major war with the West over Yugoslavia. In either case, the apparent turn to the West by Tito was his greatest sin and proof of his earlier guilt. In Stalin's circular logic it confirmed that Tito and his renegade clique were in fact agents of imperialism.

One such traitorous act by the Yugoslavs was the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Greece and Turkey at Ankara on February 28, 1953. This seemingly presaged a definite move to the West by Yugoslavia. Many Western observers rather naively expected Yugoslavia to become a member of NATO as her partners in the Balkan Pact, Greece and Turkey, had in September of 1951. Indeed, such a move did seem plausible at this time considering the hostile actions of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc. Actually however, the signing of the Balkan Pact was the closest Tito

²⁵ Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, And Company, 1970), p. 377.

was to come to NATO and, in fact, the Treaty itself was one of the reasons Tito did not have to join NATO.

The Balkan Pact had a short life span and was born only after international events had made it possible. Relations between Greece and Yugoslavia were not good in the immediate post World War II years. There were two basic reasons for this. One of these was the active and open support given to the Greek communist guerrillas by the Yugoslavs. This aid included training centers in Yugoslavia, weapons and supplies, hospital facilities, and permission to cross into Yugoslavia when pursued by the Greek national army. This aid naturally did not foster cordial relations with the Greek government engaged in a death struggle with the communist insurgents. As has been disclosed, Stalin told the Yugoslavs in February of 1948 to cease aiding the Greek communists. However, active aid continued until the spring of 1949 almost a year after the break with the Soviet Union.²⁶

The Soviet-Yugoslavia break left the Greek communists in an ambiguous position. They wanted to continue to be close to the Soviet Union and the Cominform, but at the same time continue their close relations with Yugoslavia from whom they received most of their aid. This theoretical problem soon came to be a power struggle between General Markos, who favored continued collaboration with Yugoslavia, and Secretary Zahariades, who took the position of the Cominform.

²⁶ John O. Iatrides, Balkan Triangle (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 56-57.

Zanariades' faction won and General Markos was relieved of his post in the winter of 1948. In a series of bitter accusations in the spring of 1949, the KKE leaders accused the Yugoslavs of sabotaging their movement. Apparently the KKE leaders were unaware that their Great Father, Stalin, had abandoned them in February of 1948, more than a year earlier. Tito replied almost immediately accusing the KKE leadership of blindly following the Cominform line and jeopardizing the revolution in Greece. This exchange and the closing of the border in August of 1949 marked the end of Yugoslavia's support of the Greek communists.²⁷

The remaining obstacle to better relations between Greece and Yugoslavia was the perennial question of Macedonia. The Macedonian people inhabit an area overlapping three countries; Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The area and people have long been a source of discord between all three countries. While Tito was still aiding the Greek communists, he envisioned a Macedonian Republic to be joined with a Bulgarian Republic as parts of an enlarged Yugoslavia. The break with the Soviet Union and the failure of the Greek communist revolt put an end to this grandiose vision. However, Tito did not abandon his claims to Greek Macedonia. In statements during the summer of 1950, the Yugoslavs claimed that the Macedonian minority living in Greece was being persecuted and that the Belgrade government felt

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 59-60.

obligated to protect "Yugoslavs" living in Greece. The Greek government replied that as far as Greece was concerned no such minorities question existed. Greek-Yugoslav relations were virtually at an impasse.

However, international events in the summer of 1950 prompted a new thaw in Greek-Yugoslav relations. Foremost of these events was the outbreak of the Korean War in June. This was accompanied by serious incidents along the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border. It seemed to many observers that a military offensive was being prepared against the Balkans. Accordingly, the dispute over Macedonia was toned down if not completely forgotten. A large number of Greek prisoners and children were released by the Yugoslavs on November 6, 1950. This was followed by a series of visits by political leaders and military men between the two countries. Questions of joint defense were the main reason for the talks. In September of 1952 General Pavle Jaksic of Yugoslavia headed a team of officers visiting Greece. There, a general agreement in principle was reached that in the event of communist aggression in the Balkans the military forces of the two countries would cooperate in matters of defense. The Yugoslavs were unwilling to enter into a more formal agreement as the Greeks would have liked.²⁸

Relations between Yugoslavia and Turkey were cool for various reasons. Serbia had been part of the oppressive

²⁸Ibid., pp. 69-74.

Ottoman Empire for centuries before winning full independence in 1878. Post World War II relations were no better. Turkey was staunchly anti-communist while Yugoslavia was the spearhead of communism in the Balkans. A more specific source of discord was Yugoslav mistreatment and persecution of the Muslim minority in Yugoslavia. However, the same forces which caused relations with Greece to improve, that is: the Korean War, the sovietization of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and the military threat from the Soviet Union, soon produced a thaw in Yugoslav-Turk relations. An important step was taken in January of 1950 when Yugoslavia agreed to compensate Turks whose property had been lost in Yugoslavia as a result of nationalization. In September of 1952 the same military team which had visited Greece earlier in the month visited Ankara. A few months later Tito declared that Turkey would be included in any agreement on Yugoslavia's defense because "aggression is not limited by geography and there can be no neutrality in the world." Thus, Turkey as well as Greece seemed to be ready to join Yugoslavia in a defense agreement by the end of 1952.²⁹

A final and important factor in the development of a Balkan Treaty was pressure from the allies and especially the United States. One such figure in this effort was the American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, George Allen. When American

²⁹Ibid., pp. 81-86.

aid began flowing into Yugoslavia in 1951, Ambassador Allen requested that American aid to Yugoslavia be shipped through the Greek port of Thessaloniki. Otherwise, Allen threatened, American aid may be stopped. The Yugoslavs of course agreed. Through this and similiar measures, the Americans encouraged a reconciliation between the three countries. During June and July of 1952 American Under Secretary of Defense Frank C. Nash visited the three countries. This was followed in August by a visit to Belgrade by American Secretary of the Army Frank Pace. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden visited Belgrade in September. These three visits and the continued American presence in Yugoslavia undoubtedly encouraged a tripartite defense pact.³⁰

Tito still had grave reservations about a formal pact and wanted only an ad hoc informal agreement. There were several reasons for this feeling. First, Tito was still a Marxist-Leninist and suspicious of the West as were the rank and file party members. He could not ignore the possibility that any such overt move to the West might incite a revolt among his more Moscow oriented followers. Also, he did not want to be tied to any one side after his experience with Stalin and the Cominform. In addition, Tito had to consider the possibility that a formal pact with two NATO members might be interpreted by the Soviet bloc as a hostile act and might actually provoke a Soviet strike

³⁰Ibid., pp. 95-96.

against Yugoslavia. Also, Yugoslavia and Italy still had a serious dispute over Trieste and this remained a sore spot between Yugoslavia and a stronger association with the West.

The question of Trieste was a complicated and serious obstacle to better relations between Yugoslavia and Italy and, by extension, the West. Briefly, the issue of Trieste arose after the War when Yugoslavia occupied a Zone B while a Zone A was under Anglo-American occupation. In 1948 the allies decided to return both zones to Italy much to Yugoslavia's outrage. However, this was not done. Concerning the Balkan Pact, Italy was not against a pact as such but felt the Trieste issue should be settled first. In 1952, the allies turned over administration of Zone A to Italy without consulting Belgrade. This enraged Tito and troops were sent to the border. The allies cancelled their decision but after this Tito used the possibility of a Balkan Pact as leverage with the West for a Yugoslav solution to the Trieste dispute. Fearing growing Italian influence in the Balkans and the continued pressure from the West, Tito changed his mind and called for a formal agreement with Greece and Turkey. He made this public in a speech in December of 1952.³¹

In November of 1952 the Central Committee of the CPY and the Yugoslav National Assembly approved resolutions

³¹Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 420-421.

calling for common defense measures with Greece and Turkey. This was followed by reciprocal visits of the three Foreign Ministers in January and February of 1953. After some spirited negotiations, it was agreed to sign a political agreement and hope for a military pact in the future. Both Greece and Turkey felt that Yugoslavia would soon join NATO, and in such a case a tripartite military agreement would not be necessary. In any case, the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration was signed at Ankara by the three Foreign Ministers on February 28, 1953 and became effective on May 29 when the instruments of ratification were exchanged.³²

Although a political agreement, the treaty puts great emphasis on matters of security. The signatories commit themselves to consult and cooperate on matters concerning common defense. It is specified that strictly internal developments such as changes of government are not the province of the treaty. In addition, it specifies in Article 8 that the rights and obligations of Greece and Turkey under the NATO treaty are not to be affected by this accord. The treaty calls for increased cooperation in economic, technical, and cultural affairs. The treaty is declared open to other states provided their membership is deemed beneficial by all three parties.³³

The relationship between the treaty countries and NATO

³²Iatrides, Balkan Triangle, pp. 94-104.

³³"Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia," in Iatrides, Balkan Triangle, pp. 187-189

was a very important one. The treaty called for frank consultations and mutual defense planning between the three countries. Although the treaty stated that it did not affect Greek and Turkish obligations under NATO, frank consultations meant that overall NATO defense planning for the Balkans was made known to the Yugoslavs. In addition, in the event of an attack on Yugoslavia, any Greek or Turkish assistance could only be undertaken after consultations with NATO headquarters. However, there was little doubt that NATO headquarters would approve Greek and Turkish assistance if those two countries deemed it necessary. This in turn would involve NATO. As Iatrides states, "Only in a narrow legal sense could it be said that NATO was in no way responsible for the security of the entire Balkan group."³⁴ Therefore, for all practical purposes Tito had placed himself under the blanket of NATO protection without actually joining the Western bloc. Such a position left open a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and allowed the continued support of even the staunchest Marxists in the Yugoslav Party. Although Greece and Turkey and many others felt this treaty presaged Yugoslavia's joining of NATO, this was the closest Tito was to come to joining the Western bloc.

Throughout the summer of 1953 military talks continued although Yugoslavia steadfastly refused to enter into a military pact or to join NATO. This feeling changed mainly as

³⁴Iatrides, Balkan Triangle, p. 106.

a result of some poorly timed actions by the West concerning Trieste. In October of 1953 Britain and the United States announced that they were turning over Zone A entirely to Italy and withdrawing their troops from Trieste. This announcement was again made without any consultation with Belgrade. This brought forth a strong reaction from Tito. He denounced the Western powers and Italy and moved troops to the frontier. The issue remained tense throughout the year and was further complicated by the improvement in relations between Italy and Yugoslavia's partners in the treaty. This fact, combined with the easing of tensions with the Soviet Union made possible by the death of Stalin in March of 1953, indicated that Tito entered into the military alliance of 1954 as a move for greater diplomatic leverage against Italy.³⁵

The Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was signed at Bled, Yugoslavia on August 9, 1954. This took place only after long negotiations complicated by the issue of Trieste and the relationship of the treaty to NATO. Article 2 of the treaty states that an armed attack on one will be regarded as an attack on all. After such an aggression, the three countries would immediately undertake mutual consultations to determine a course of action. Thus, the treaty does not call for automatic military action should an attack occur. It is stated that

³⁵Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 420-425.

Yugoslavia is not required to take military action should Greece and Turkey be drawn into a conflict through their NATO obligations. The treaty again contains the provision that Greek and Turkish rights and obligations under NATO are not affected by the treaty. Several Articles pledge to conform to the United Nations Charter and to inform that body of any action taken. The treaty calls for the creation of a Permanent Secretariat through which the three countries will coordinate their activities.³⁶

Actually, coming when it did, the Treaty of Bled was practically stillborn. Immediately after the signing of the treaty, the three Foreign Ministers played down the military aspects of the pact. The Secretariat failed to meet after the fall of 1955 and various other tasks were left undone. The real death blow for the treaty was the outbreak of the Cyprus crisis between Greece and Turkey in September 1955. For Yugoslavia, the beginning of the end of the Balkan Pact was the easing of tensions with the Soviet Union made possible by the death of Stalin in March 1953. However, the two Balkan treaties did strengthen Yugoslavia's hand in dealing with both the East and the West. This period was a very critical period for Yugoslavia and Tito steered through it unscathed and uncompromised. As Iatrides states, "For the Belgrade regime the Balkan Pact was a temporary and ideological

³⁶"Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation and Mutual Assistance," in Iatrides, Balkan Triangle, pp. 189-193.

cumbersome accommodation, to be sought and cultivated only as long as the Communist camp remained hostile toward Yugoslavia's ruling elite."³⁷

Another reason for the demise of the Balkan Pact was that Yugoslav foreign policy had taken on an increasingly internationalist character. Yugoslav experience in the United Nations in the early 50's was one of the reasons for this change. In the immediate post war years Yugoslavia dutifully followed the Soviet line on every issue brought before the United Nations. This policy even continued after the June 1948 break for a short time. For example, in 1949 Yugoslavia favored the admission of Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria even though these countries were violently anti-Tito at the time. Yugoslavia recognized the People's Republic of China in 1949 and supported its right to a seat on the Security Council. However, this adherence to the Soviet line changed as the Yugoslavs realized the seriousness of the rift with the Cominform.³⁸

In late 1949 the decision was made to bring the conflict with the Soviet Union before the United Nations. In a speech before the United Nations on September 26 Edward Kardelj, the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, sharply criticized the Soviet Union for interference in Yugoslav internal

³⁷Iatrides, Balkan Triangle, p. 182.

³⁸Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 151-155.

affairs. This was the first time the issue had been aired before the United Nations. Kardelj charged the Soviet Union with slander and lies, an economic blockade, terrorist activities, and countless frontier incidents. This was of course refuted by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Vyshinsky. A further dispute centered on Yugoslavia's bid to fill a non-permanent seat in the Security Council in 1949. The Soviet Union tried to block the nomination by citing the "gentlemen's agreement" to the effect that equal membership be given on a basis of geographical distribution. Since Yugoslavia was East European, Slavic, and communist, the Soviet position was seen to be one of simple hostility to the Tito regime. Accordingly, the General Assembly on October 20, 1949 elected Yugoslavia on the second ballot to a two year term on the Security Council. This was important because it was during this period that Yugoslavia came into prolonged contact with the new nations of Asia and Africa and the "seeds of nonalignment germinated."³⁹

As a member of the Security Council, Yugoslavia was in the forefront of negotiations over the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950. Yugoslavia supported the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution which gave the General Assembly the power to make recommendations for collective measures of self defense even if there is a lack of unanimity in the Security Council. Later however, the Yugoslav delegation disapproved

³⁹Ibid., pp. 15-21.

of the decision to cross north of the thirty-eighth parallel and upset the status quo existing before the outbreak of war. Even now Yugoslavia was putting forward a nonaligned position. During the debate on Korea at the United Nations in September of 1950, Kardelj stated, "The peoples of Yugoslavia cannot accept the assumption that mankind must today choose between the domination of one great power or another."⁴⁰

The Yugoslav view of the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia changed perceptively during the early years at the United Nations. Early impressions were of course conditioned by the views of the Soviet Union. Nehru of India and Jinnah of Pakistan were denounced as agents of British and American imperialism and Sukarno of Indonesia was labeled a fascist for cooperating with the Japanese during World War II. The independent position taken by India, Burma, and Egypt during the Korean War forced a reevaluation of the new states. Of critical importance was the cooperation among India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia while all were members of the Security Council in 1950-51. The three tended to agree on most of the issues confronting them at this time. It was apparent that there was room for a new approach to world problems outside of the two existing power blocs. As Rubinstein states, "The United Nations became the Yugoslav bridge to the Third World."⁴¹

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 29.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 37.

CHAPTER 111

THE THEORY OF NONALIGNMENT

The new approach to world problems envisioned by Yugoslavia and certain other states in the early 1950's came to be known as the policy of nonalignment. Of course, this policy did not spring up overnight but had a long and tortuous history. Unfortunately, there has not evolved a body of coherent thought that one can unmistakably label as nonalignment. This nebulous character of the ideology, if it can be called that, is caused in part by the wide diversity of the nations professing a policy of nonalignment. These countries adopted a policy of nonalignment for different reasons and from different historical perspectives. We have seen that the prime historical occurrence which induced Yugoslavia to adopt a policy of nonalignment was the break with the Soviet Union in 1948. However, this would not have led to an international policy of nonalignment shared by many countries unless the international setting in general had favored the adoption of such a policy by not only Yugoslavia but a wide variety of nations.

The post World War II world was shaped by two developments which have extreme importance in the formation of the policy of nonalignment and to international relations in general. These two political phenomena were the formation

of the blocs and the disintegration of colonialism. The fact that the temporary war time alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union dissolved in the late 1940's is well known and documented. A more interesting question is why this split occurred. The accepted view is that the West and principally the United States reacted to Soviet military and ideological threats directed toward Western Europe. A newer and more questionable theory is that of the "revisionist" historians of the West. Their position is that the United States overreacted to anti-communist hysteria and, by creating a military bloc, actually started the Cold War and fostered the emergence of the bipolar world in international relations. In either case the split led to the creation of NATO and subsequently the Warsaw Pact, and this bipolar structure reflected the actual balance of power in Europe at this time.

This existing situation in terms of power was accompanied by ideologies on both sides justifying the creation of military blocs. These ideologies sought to extend the bipolar situation existing in Europe at this time to the rest of the world, and it was partly as a response to this that the concept of nonalignment was developed.

The Russian version of this ideology was the so called "two camp" thesis associated with Zhdanov until his death in 1948. The friendly relations between the West and the East in 1945 was only a temporary phenomenon. Early in 1946

the Soviet line as enunciated by Stalin became increasingly critical of the West. At the twenty-ninth anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution (November 7, 1946), Andrei Zhdanov, the Leningrad Party Chief, condemned the Western attitude toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He made a particular point to stress that the Eastern European countries should unite behind the leadership of the Soviet Union. This theme was repeated, again by Zhdanov, at the formal inauguration of the Cominform in September of 1947 at Szklarska Poreba in Poland; where he accused the United States of hostility to Eastern Europe and noted that the only consequence of this action was the division of the world into two camps. The doctrine had become dominant by the time of Tito's expulsion in 1948.⁴²

The response of the United States to the Soviet threat in Europe is well known. The response took four political forms: the Truman doctrine, containment, the Marshall Plan, and the American alliance system. The creation of NATO in 1949 was a pivotal point in this development but only one of many alliances concluded by the United States during this time. The Republican Administration in 1952 ushered in a new policy of liberation. Secretary of State Dulles spoke in terms of "rolling back the Iron Curtain." This policy was demonstrated to be mere verbiage in 1956 but it did tighten the bipolar nature of relations in Europe. The alliance

⁴²Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, pp. 41-64.

system was extended globally by Dulles as he saw the threat of international monolithic communism everywhere. Dulles viewed the incipient policy of nonalignment as basically immoral. His basic approach was that any nation not actively aligned with the United States was, by definition, against the United States. Thus, the ideologies of both super powers condoned and actively pursued the two camp or two bloc structure of international relations at this time.

Nations such as Yugoslavia and new states such as India felt this forced adherence to blocs threatened world peace. They felt this led to a system of relations featuring the rule that might is right and condoning interference in the internal affairs of nations. Fearing this and zealously guarding their independence, these and other states resisted the overtures of the two blocs. Also, the power bloc rivalry inevitably led to an armament race with the destructive potential for a conflict becoming even greater. The principle of non-interference and the equality of nations were not new ideas. These principles are embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. As one Yugoslav scholar states, "It is only as an anti-thesis to blocs that the policy of non-alignment constitutes a new category in international relations."⁴³

The second major historical event bringing about the policy of nonalignment was the disintegration of colonialism

⁴³Ranko Petkovic, Non-alignment in the Contemporary World (Belgrade: Medunarodna Stampa-Interpress, 1968), p. 5.

and the birth of new states in Asia and Africa. The decline of colonialism is a matter of common historical record. From the beginning, many of these new states assumed a posture of neutralism or noncommittment as it was variously called. Some writers have attempted to distinguish between Asian and African nonalignment and the nonalignment practiced by Yugoslavia. Indeed, there are gradations of nonalignment as practiced by various countries. In retrospect however, it seems these differences reflected the personalities and ideologies of the three principal leaders of nonalignment; Nehru, Nasser, and Tito. Nehru personified the moral man of peace; Nasser the fiery anti-colonialist; and Tito the defender of independence between two mighty blocs. Although these are only generalizations, they do reflect the three main strands of nonalignment.

Yugoslav writers often state that the advent of nonalignment was inevitable given the historical forces prevalent at the time. This reflects the historical determinism which characterizes Marxist thought. Other writers however, state that the policy of nonalignment was assumed because of very real conditions common to many countries at this time, particularly the new states of Africa and Asia. An Asian writer states that, "Nonalignment initially was a method of determining free Asia's relations with the West."⁴⁴

⁴⁴Sisir K. Gupta, "Asian Nonalignment," in Politics in Transitional Societies, ed. by Harvey G. Kebschull (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 387.

While this may be true particularly for India, it fails to account for the widespread acceptance of nonalignment by widely divergent Asian and African states, and even one European state. Professor Cecel Crabb has deduced four main reasons for the widespread adoption of nonalignment.

One of these reasons is what Crabb calls the "legacy of colonialism." To the countries of Asia and Africa, the term colonialism is applied almost exclusively to the West. This is due to more than the historic fact that Western European nations were the main colonizing states in the past. Much to the dismay of the West, Third World observers do not consider the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe as colonialism. For one thing, the states of Eastern Europe are nominally independent and not completely subjugated as the Afro-Asian colonies were. Also, the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe lacks the racial factor which makes Western colonialism such an explosive issue to former colonial people.

Colonialism induces a policy of nonalignment in the Third World because it is considered a very real and continuing problem. This attitude may not accurately reflect the current situation but the acceptance of the threat of "neo-colonialism" makes it very real nevertheless. Also, the continued colonial holdings of Portugal gives the idea added validity. Finally, nonalignment appeals to these nations precisely because control over foreign policy was

the last remnant of colonialism and perhaps the most bitterly fought over. Even after the granting of formal independence, the colonial powers by various means, notably through groups such as the British Commonwealth. Therefore, many states adopted a policy of nonalignment as proof of their independence from the former metropole.⁴⁵

One may wonder how Yugoslavia fits into this framework. Of course, Yugoslavia was not part of a Western colonial empire and its acceptance of nonalignment must be considered somewhat of an aberration in this case. However, from 1945 to 1948 Yugoslavia was firmly within the Soviet bloc. Although this doesn't qualify as classic colonialism for the reasons mentioned above, it certainly was a position of less than total independence especially in matters of foreign policy. Yugoslav reaction to this period of Soviet domination accounts to a great extent for their adoption of the policy of nonalignment.

The second influence identified by Crabb is the search for ideological identity. It has only recently been realized in the West, and then not by all, that such issues as democracy versus communism or East versus West have little if any relevance for Third World countries. What is important for the individual country is that country's own traditions and values. The policy of nonalignment confers an intellectual

⁴⁵Cecil V. Crabb, The Elephant and the Grass (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 39-48.

and spiritual freedom to a country to go along with political freedom. Not only does nonalignment give a country a sense of intellectual freedom, it also attempts to make a positive contribution to international relations by stating a new outlook, a fresh approach not bound by ideological dogmatism. Nonaligned countries claim to be more objective in assessing global issues than are those in the blocs. Thus, the policy of nonalignment claims to enable a country to play a greater role in international relations and in settling international disputes.⁴⁶

This has long been an important element in Yugoslavia's conception of nonalignment. This independent ideological position which seeks to mediate for peace between the two blocs is called active and peaceful coexistence by the Yugoslavs. According to a common definition, the policy of active and peaceful coexistence is simply a means of applying the principles of the United Nations Charter to international relations. It means collaboration with other nonaligned countries and also collaboration with blocs or members of blocs depending on the specific issue. In addition to working for peace in general, the principles of active peaceful coexistence are used to promote international cooperation in the field of economic assistance to the Third World.⁴⁷

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 48-58.

⁴⁷Ljubomir Radovanovic, The Policy of Non-Aligned Countries (Belgrade: Medjunarodna Politika, 1964), pp. 9-16.

It should be noticed that active peaceful coexistence as pronounced by nonaligned countries is not the peaceful coexistence declared by the Soviet Union. Peaceful coexistence to the Soviets means simply that the ultimate communist victory need not come about by military means. This reflects the nature of modern nuclear war but is not a refutation of bloc policies and methods. The nonaligned countries of course realize the dangers of modern weaponry by also feel that the danger of a nuclear holocaust is made greater by the very existence of blocs. Consequently, the nonaligned countries are for nuclear disarmament as well as for the disintegration of blocs.

A third factor identified by Crabb is the political balance in neutralist societies. The new states of Africa and Asia are notoriously unstable. The reasons for this instability are not difficult to ascertain. Many of these countries are in fact artificial creations of Western colonialism. Many contain various ethnic groups and tribes which have little in common once the fight for independence was won. This and a general feeling of disappointment with the results of independence, and the problem of rising expectations and a static or declining economy make these new states highly explosive. Also, there's the tradition of opposition to the central government dating from colonial days. The policy of nonalignment, being an active foreign policy, serves to unify the diverse elements in a state.

The policy of nonalignment, accompanied by periodic denunciations of the West, is generally acceptable to the various groupings within a state. This policy confers much needed status upon a country and its leaders. Also, it tends to divert attention from the very real problems at home. Thus, a policy of nonalignment is seen as instrumental in holding these fragile states together until a real feeling of nationhood can be instilled in the people.⁴⁸

Another scholar has analyzed this problem from a little different perspective. George Liska has also noted the factionalism and instability in underdeveloped countries. This has led to what he calls the "internationalization of domestic politics" as various internal groups try to align themselves with foreign powers. Nonalignment counteracts this tendency by making any alignment with foreign powers highly suspect in the eyes of the people. Another reason for the policy of nonalignment is one of simple economics. Many countries simply can't afford a defense program and still pursue economic development. The main economic reason however, is that nonalignment allows a country to receive economic aid from both sides in the Cold War. Liska states flatly, "Nonalignment and neutralism are international policies inspired largely by domestic concerns."⁴⁹

⁴⁸Crabb, The Elephant and the Grass, pp. 58-65.

⁴⁹George Liska, "The 'Third Party': The Rationale of Nonalignment," in Neutralism and Nonalignment, ed. by Laurence W. Martin (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 91.

The case of Yugoslavia is no exception to this motive for nonalignment. As mentioned earlier, Tito's defiance of Stalin rallied Yugoslavs of various ideologies and nationalities behind his regime. Anyone familiar with Yugoslavia knows the extreme ethnic diversity of the state. There are five main groups: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and also significant numbers of Moslems, Hungarians, and Sniptars. These nationalities are further divided by religion, language, and cultural characteristics. The Croats and the Serbs fought a bloody civil war during World War II which had religious and political overtones. The active foreign policy of nonalignment has given Tito and Yugoslavia great status in the eyes of the world. This has aided Tito in holding the diverse state together. This was especially true during periods when Yugoslavia seemed most threatened. Alas, as international tensions ease somewhat, ethnic passions are again aroused and now even threaten the very existence of Yugoslavia.

The last reason for nonalignment identified by Crabb is a pure strategic reason as perceived by individual states. Obviously, the decision to align or not is one which each country must decide upon the basis of its own history and perception of external threat. In general however, many former colonial states feel that "protection" as offered by either the West or the East leads to a state of dependency which is neocolonialist and unacceptable in the modern world.

Liska attacks this problem on a world wide scale. He cites the danger of provoking one side by aligning with a great power in a bipolar structure. "The political cost of alliance becomes extravagant when it entails not only an initial compromise with the ally, but the liability of adding his enemies to one's own as well."⁵⁰ Such a condition can force an entire region into the bipolar structure as each country races to be aligned with a great power. The danger of both small scale and world wide war is thus expanded. This danger of limited war in the land of the smaller ally is heightened by the nuclear deterrence system employed by the great powers. With nuclear war unacceptable, each side will attempt to show that its opponent cannot protect its corresponding small ally. Thus, the small nation is thrust into the untenable position of being a pawn in the larger struggle. A small country's best defense against great power encroachments thus becomes the pressure of world opinion as expressed by the whole community of non-aligned countries.

Another problem is the frank question of whether or not the West particularly can protect a small country without destroying it, especially if the country is close to the Sino-Soviet border. The case of Vietnam seems to suggest a negative answer to this question. The simple fact is that the United States appears to have been unable to protect

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 83.

South Vietnam and may leave it in physical and economic ruin. However, the question is whether or not South Vietnam could have avoided a conflict with a policy of nonalignment. The experience of Cambodia until recently seems to suggest a positive answer. In South Vietnam however, a military conflict was probably inevitable given a divided state and an active guerrilla movement. However, with a policy of nonalignment the conflict would not have been internationalized and its scope would have been limited. Surely, the state of South Vietnam, if not the particular government, would have been much better off with a policy of nonalignment.

This strategic reason is obviously one that influenced Tito and other Yugoslav leaders to adopt a policy of nonalignment. As has been mentioned, there was a very real danger of Soviet or satellite aggression against Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia did join the Balkan Pact to counteract this but refrained from joining NATO. One reason for this refusal was the danger of provoking the Soviet Union into an attack on Yugoslavia. Also, standing on the border of the Soviet bloc, there was a question of whether the West could prevent the Yugoslavs from simply being overrun by the Soviets. In the long run, the policy of nonalignment allowed Yugoslavia to have more or less friendly relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe because they didn't join the Western alliance and add its enemies to their own.

Thus, we have the policy of nonalignment as an

"anti-thesis to blocs" in conjunction with the principles of active and peaceful coexistence as the common ingredients in the foreign policy of the nonaligned countries. We have noted the inducements to this policy which prompted many states including Yugoslavia to adopt this policy. We should now examine closer the specific principles which Yugoslavia and other nonaligned countries endorse as a basis for international relations.

It is apparent that the nonaligned countries do not have a monopoly on these principles. In view of our earlier definition of active peaceful coexistence as applying the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, it is not surprising that these principles correspond closely to those of the UN and to international law. The following were given in a semi-official Yugoslav publication as some of the more important principles of nonalignment.

1. The Principle of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity. This simply means the full independence of the authority of a country from any other authority within or without the state. The Yugoslavs claim that whenever you have blocs it invariably means domination by one of the great powers. Only through the dissolution of blocs will all states become fully independent.

2. The Principle of Equality of Nations. Equality among states and peoples is what the policy of nonalignment is trying to bring about. Again the assumption is that the

relations between states in a bloc or alliance is unequal by definition.

3. The Principle of Non-Aggression. It is assumed that aggression is an integral part of bloc policies. This is largely because of the conflict between the blocs and in the contest for further allies in the Third World. The danger to world peace is heightened by the arms race fostered by the presence of blocs. In the absence of blocs, all states would be isolated and thus more amenable to international law and to such a peace keeping organization as the United Nations.

4. The Principle of Non-Interference in the Internal Affairs of Other Countries. Included in this is not only overt military interference but such interference as economic and cultural pressure. The blocs in their struggle for allies and footholds are said to make interference a way of life.

5. The Principle of Self-Determination of Nations. This means the right of every people to form their own state and their own political and economic system. Reference is made to the people of the world who have not yet gained their independence, and it is stated that every effort should be made to uproot the remnants of colonialism and other forms of domination.

6. The Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. This means basically just what it says. In particular, it

means resorting to the United Nations and the procedures there for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Bloc policies are said to be built on the principle that might is right.

7. The Principle of Active International Cooperation. All forms of peaceful international cooperation are deemed useful. However, the United Nations is regarded as the central means of international cooperation. There can be no meaningful cooperation in a world of blocs because each side attempts to impose its own way of life on each other and on third parties.

8. Non-Participation in the Military Alliances of Great Powers. This is really the main theme of nonalignment. Blocs are considered one of the main sources of division in the modern world. Military alliances by their very nature are held to increase international tensions. Thus, by declaring themselves against military alliances and not participating in them, nonaligned countries are an effective force for peace in the modern world.⁵¹

Obviously, the above general principles are ideas to which a wide variety of nations adhere if not follow in their conduct of international relations. They parallel well known concepts in international law and in the Charter of the United Nations. There is an effort here to put non-alignment upon as broad a base as possible so to attract

⁵¹Petkovic, Non-alignment in the Contemporary World, pp. 29-37.

as many countries as possible. However, the Yugoslavs make it clear that they are not attempting to form a third bloc because nonalignment is against the very concept of blocs.

However, this listing of principles and their meaning raises serious questions concerning the Yugoslav view of the world situation. The Yugoslavs may have the proverbial cart before the horse. The Yugoslavs and other nonaligned states believe that blocs are a source of division in the world and one of the principle sources of aggression. The two blocs came into existence as the result of a fundamental conflict between two powerful states that happened to face each other in the power vacuum that was post-war Europe. Regardless of how this conflict is viewed, ideological or nationalistic, the blocs reflect this conflict but are not the source of it. However, once created the blocs did increase tensions and served to prevent a meaningful detente.

Another problem is whether the blocs are a source of aggression or whether they in fact prevent aggression. The application of the policy of containment to Europe by the United States brought order and stability to Europe as a whole. Whether or not this should be an objective of your foreign policy is another question. The creation of the two alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, brought stability to Europe because it raised the level of any conflict to that of world war. The development of nuclear weapons and

the subsequent "balance of terror" is a stabilizing force in international relations because the results of total war are unacceptable to both sides. However, this fact has not prevented the outbreak of limited wars and wars of national liberation. In short, the assumption that a world in which every state exists absolutely independently is inherently more peaceful is open to question.

Another problem is that the theory and principles of nonalignment do not differentiate between the two blocs. The assumption seems to be that every ally of the East or West was forced into the alliance and that the relationship within the alliance is detrimental to independence, sovereignty, and equality of nations. Yugoslavia's unfortunate history in the Soviet bloc may have colored her view of all alliances. The Brezhnev Doctrine in the Soviet bloc does in fact limit sovereignty and condones interference and intervention in nominally independent states. However, the Western bloc does not condone any such violations of international law and, unlike the East, none have occurred. Of course, the United States is the great power in the West and assumes a position of leadership which is exercised by political and economic pressure. These measures are certainly not contrary to international law however. This lack of objectivity is one of the chief weaknesses of nonalignment as we shall see in specific situations later.

Finally, we should note the differences between classic neutrality and nonalignment. Neutrality is an old

concept formalized by international law. It may be defined as, "The legal position of a state which remained aloof from a war between two other states or groups of states while maintaining certain rights towards the belligerents and observing certain duties prescribed by customary law or by international conventions or treaties."⁵² According to Fenwick, the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations marked the end of neutrality as a legal position because all states were responsible for peace keeping. However, the neutralization of Austria in 1955 brought back the idea of neutrality. Austria and Switzerland by international law and Sweden by tradition are considered neutral states today. They refrain from participation in conflicts and take a neutral or middle position between the two blocs.

Nonalignment differs from classic neutrality primarily because it is an active not a passive policy. Nonaligned countries do not take a middle position in disputes but rather attempt to judge the problem objectively and to find an equitable solution. Thus, a nonaligned country may agree or disagree with a particular bloc depending on the specific issue. This judgement is made, at least in principle, regardless of ideology or political system. However, this does not imply a neutral position as regards the ideology or political system in its intrinsic value. However, both groups share a non-adherence to military-political groups

⁵²Charles G. Fenwick, International Law (4th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), p. 716.

and in a general struggle for peace.

Nonalignment serves a dual purpose for Yugoslavia as it does for most states professing that policy. The first is the taking of an independent position between the East and the West; a policy growing out of the break with the Soviet Union and the subsequent decision to align with the West. The second strand is a more internationalist one. It involves active cooperation with the countries of the Third World and an active opposition to alliances and blocs as such. Of course, any such separation of foreign policy is somewhat artificial as each supports and complements the other. However, it is useful for purposes of analysis, keeping in mind that together they make for a complete policy of nonalignment. We should now take a look at the internationalist aspect of Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment and examine the success or failure of this policy.

CHAPTER IV

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE THIRD WORLD

Yugoslavia as a state had little if any contact with the Third World before the Second World War as most of these states were still under colonial bondage. In the immediate post war years Yugoslavia naturally followed the Soviet line in relation to the Third World and contacts remained sparse and arbitrary. Yugoslavia remained cold and distant to the Third World even after the break with the Soviet Union in 1948. As has been mentioned, Yugoslavia served with India and Egypt as non-permanent members of the Security Council in 1950-51. This experience was very important because it enabled Yugoslavia to shed some of the Marxist illusions it had held concerning the newly independent countries. Yugoslavia discovered it shared similar opinions and had similar problems as these countries. Also, Yugoslavia saw a chance to end its relative diplomatic isolation and to influence and share in the disintegration of colonialism. Yugoslavia also sought to develop economic relations with the new states.

As much as the United Nations was the bridge to the Third World, Yugoslavia still had to establish contacts on a bilateral basis to encourage closer ties. This she was gradually able to do in the following years. Visits to Third

World countries were made by a variety of Yugoslav groups and representatives. One of the more important visits was as a representative to the first Asian Socialist Conference held in Rangoon in January 1953. Yugoslavia and Israel, both of whom had worked hard for the invitation, were the only non-Asian states represented. Yugoslavia was ably represented by Milovan Djilas and Ales Bebler. They both were struck by the force of Asian nationalism and the appeal of socialism, as opposed to communism, to Asians at this time. Accordingly, the Socialist Alliance, a mass front organization in Yugoslavia, instead of the League of Yugoslav Communists was used as a vehicle of visits in the following years. This practice continues today unless the host country is avowedly Marxist. For their part, the Yugoslavs stressed the similarities between Yugoslavia and the new states of Asia, as well as the nature of Yugoslav socialism as compared to that of the Soviet Union. This conference served as an important link and educational device for both Yugoslavia and the new states of Asia.⁵³

In addition to attending this conference, Yugoslavia established bilateral contacts with a few selected states of Asia and Africa. For example, Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations with Ethiopia in March of 1952 following reciprocal visits by Foreign Ministry personnel. Of course, the main common ingredient was an intense dislike

⁵³Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, pp. 39-42.

for Italy. Haile Selassie's visit to Belgrade in July 1954 was the first by any African leader to Yugoslavia. Relations were cemented by trade agreements and agreements on technical assistance concluded by the two countries.

Similiarly, relations with Burma began in this early period. An important factor was the selling of arms to Burma by Yugoslavia in December 1952. These arms enabled the Burmese to defeat rebels and remnants of the Chinese Nationalist Army then operating in the mountains of Northern Burma. The sale also deepened the friendship between Tito and the Premier of Burma, U Nu. After the overthrow of King Farouk in July 1952, relations with Egypt became increasingly friendly. The sale of arms to Egypt in 1953 by Yugoslavia in the face of Western opposition aided Yugoslavia's credibility in the eyes of the Egyptians. The Yugoslav Embassy in India was established in April 1950 but reciprocal relations were not established in Belgrade until 1954. However, relations with India gradually became warmer largely due to the persistent efforts of Ambassador Vilfan in New Delhi. At Tito's initiative, Ambassador Vilfan secured an invitation to visit India for President Tito.⁵⁴

This first visit by Tito to India and Burma was very influential in shaping Yugoslav foreign policy for the coming years. Tito visited India from December 16, 1954 to January 3, 1955 and again from January 20 to the 25th on the way

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 43-53.

back from Burma. This was Tito's first meeting with Nehru, the dominant figure in the Third World at this time, and the two leaders found they had much in common. The substance of the consultations was expressed by a joint communiqué issued on December 22, 1954. The communiqué outlined the general principles of peaceful coexistence, specified that nonalignment was an active policy and not passive neutrality, and made it clear that this did not mean the establishment of a third bloc.

Visiting Burma from January 6 to the 17th, Tito stressed anticolonial themes. He called for real political independence for all Asian people. He stated that every country has the right to choose its own political system depending on the conditions unique to that country. He also called for increased economic aid for the underdeveloped countries.⁵⁵

This visit had a significance beyond merely setting forth the principles of nonalignment. It served to set a pattern for the personal nature of diplomacy carried on by these countries in the future. Not only did Tito himself impress Nehru and U Nu as an individual, he made it clear that he and Yugoslavia were in fact nonaligned and not merely pawns for Russian communism. As a result, the nations of Asia and Africa were favorably disposed to Tito's brand of nonalignment and Tito and Yugoslavia became influential

⁵⁵Radovanovic, The Policy of Non-Aligned Countries, pp. 16-18.

in the fledgling movement.

The next important event for nonalignment was the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia from April 18 through April 24, 1955. The idea for an Afro-Asian Conference was initiated by Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo. He met with representatives of Burma, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan at Colombo, Ceylon and persuaded them to collectively sponsor such a conference. The foreign policy objectives of these countries, conveniently known as the Colombo group, have been described as follows: the avoidance of war especially between China and the United States, the development of China's independence from the Soviet Union, and the containment of Chinese and Vietminh political and military power.⁵⁶

The conference was attended by twenty-four countries in addition to the sponsoring five. These countries were all from Asia and Africa and included representatives from both blocs and neutralist countries. For example, such opposing states as China and Japan, and North and South Vietnam were present, as well as the few new states in Africa and most of the Middle East states. For this reason the conference is not considered a nonaligned conference.

The wide diversity of the countries represented accounts for some of the disputes that occurred at the meeting.

⁵⁶George M. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 1-10.

Chou-En-Lai represented China (Nationalist China was not represented) and was a model of friendliness and decorum. He publicly and privately assured one and all that China did not want a war with the United States or with anyone else for that matter. Actually, the main source of discord was between Nehru and those countries aligned with the West. Nehru introduced the Panch Shila, the five principles of coexistence, which Tito had agreed to in December. Nehru was particularly upset over the formation of SEATO which he saw as the extension of blocs and bloc policy in the Third World. Carlos P. Romulo, representing the Philippines, replied that the Philippines peacefully coexisted with all states but that communist states did not seem to believe in this. He called SEATO a realistic defensive strategy to combat communist aggression. Speaking on the conference later, General Romulo stated, "It is no exaggeration to say that the anti-communist states put both communism and neutralism on the defensive, scoring a signal diplomatic triumph for the free world."⁵⁷

The states at the conference issued a final communiqué which stated their objectives. These were general ideas about which everybody could agree. These included economic cooperation among Afro-Asian states and increased aid from the developed world, cultural exchanges, an end to racism,

⁵⁷Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1956), p. 22.

independence for all people and the end of colonialism, general disarmament, and a call for world peace and cooperation between the two blocs. In particular, they set forth ten principles which should guide international conduct. These "Bandung Principles" are often quoted and referred to. They are as follows:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of all nations large and small.
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.
(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation.
10. Respect for justice and international obligations.⁵⁸

In spite of these lofty principles, it is clear that

⁵⁸Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, pp. 84-85.

the Bandung Conference didn't achieve the foreign policy objectives of the Colombo group who convened the conference. Of course, there has not been a war between China and the United States and China has become independent of the Soviet Union but these two occurrences certainly didn't develop because of the influence of Bandung. The third objective, the containment of Chinese and Vietminh military power and political influence, is still in doubt. In any case, the presence of the United States has "contained" the communist presence in South and Southeast Asia. In spite of repeated allusions to the "Spirit of Bandung," the conference has had little real influence. This is because it lacked any machinery for implementing these lofty ideals. They failed also because of the diverse nature of the group assembled at Bandung. With representatives from both camps and neutralist states, the only agreements possible are bound to be bland and ineffective. Even with the more narrowly defined nonaligned states, reaching agreement on anything significant remains a problem.

However, the conference did have a symbolic significance in that it served notice on the East and the West that all future decisions must consider this grouping. Romulo states, "Bandung was, in a manner of speaking, a historical pageant, symbolizing the coming of age of Asia and Africa."⁵⁹ The significance for Yugoslavia, which was

⁵⁹Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung, p. 35.

not represented at the conference in any manner, lay in the frustration felt by Nehru, U Nu and other neutrals at being stymied by the non-communist states. From this date they were more receptive to Yugoslavia's conception of non-alignment.

In the next few years Yugoslavia stepped up its foreign policy offensive to the Third World. In 1956 Tito invited Nehru to Belgrade for a reciprocal visit and, in a calculated move, also invited the young revolutionary Egyptian leader, Gamel Abdel Nasser, who he had first met in February 1955. These leaders met at Brioni, Tito's island retreat, in July 1956. In a joint communiqué issued on July 19, the three leaders decried the tension and apprehensive atmosphere prevalent in the world and blamed the division of the world into military blocs for this atmosphere. The three leaders also vowed to maintain regular correspondence and personal visits to discuss issues of the day.⁶⁰

Tito also stepped up contacts with the rapidly increasing number of new states in Africa and Asia. For his mode of contact, Tito chose the same method as he had employed so successfully before, that is, personal contact. In December 1958 Tito embarked on a three month voyage that saw him visit Indonesia, Burma, India, Ceylon, Ethiopia, the Sudan, the U.A.R., and Greece. Again in the spring of 1961 Tito paid the first visit by a communist leader to West Africa.

⁶⁰Radovanovic, The Policy of Non-Aligned Countries, pp. 20-22.

He visited Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and the U.A.R. These visits by Tito were reinforced by numerous visits by Yugoslav labor, trade, political, and governmental figures. Throughout his visits, Tito stressed one dominant theme, anticolonialism. Rubinstein states, "Anti-colonialism has become the Yugoslav credit card to the Third World."⁶¹

This commitment can be seen in two specific instances. The first was Yugoslavia's unwavering support of Egypt during the Suez Crisis of 1956. Although the dominant Third World role was played by Nehru, Tito's support was much appreciated by Nasser. Yugoslavia was also an early and strong supporter of the FLN, the independence movement in Algeria. Yugoslavia supported Algeria's war of independence to a degree unmatched by Yugoslavia before or since. Yugoslavia covertly supplied small arms to the rebels, the only known instance in which Yugoslavia supported a national liberation struggle to this extent. Tito took this position despite the bad effect it had on relations with France. Tito seems to have taken a strong personal liking to Ahmed Ben Bella, the FLN leader. The Yugoslavs seemed to liken to Algerian struggle to their own war for independence during World War II and consequently supported it with a nostalgic vigor.⁶²

⁶¹Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Third World, p. 91.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 75-106.

We should take a brief look at the international situation as it existed in the late 50's and early 60's. The relationship between the East and West was increasingly tense. The collapse of the Paris Summit Meeting due to be held in 1960, the deadlocked nuclear test ban talks, the chaos in the Congo and the UN intervention, the conflict over the role of the Secretary General of the UN, and Castro's takeover of Cuba and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, all conspired to make the international situation extremely tense at this time. This situation plus the increasing importance of nonalignment due to the rapid decolonization in Africa made the calling of the Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned Nations a natural consequence.

The idea was initiated at a meeting between Tito and Nasser in Brioni in the summer of 1960. Later, on April 22, 1961, a joint communiqué was issued by Tito and Nasser calling for a conference of nonaligned countries to discuss the international situation. A preparatory conference was held in Cairo in June 1961 where Sukarno of Indonesia also became a sponsor. Prime Minister Nehru was conspicuously absent as a sponsor of the conference. Nehru was upset over the selection of the countries invited to attend, feeling that more countries should be invited. This reflected disagreement over the definition of nonalignment and Nehru's doubts over the efficacy of such a conference. He finally accepted his invitation on August 9, 1961, a mere

three weeks before the scheduled conference.⁶³

The final criteria for selecting states to attend the projected conference were as follows:

1. Membership in neither the communist nor the Western military bloc.
2. The absence of any bilateral military arrangement with a bloc country.
3. The absence of a foreign military base on that state's territory or the expressed opposition to such a base.
4. The support of liberation and independence movements.
5. The pursuit of a foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence.⁶⁴

It will be noticed that no mention was made of the internal political or economic system of the states. Thus, the conference included military or feudal dictatorships, democracies, one-party socialist states, and a communist state. The specific states sending delegates were as follows: Afghanistan, Algeria, (Provisional Government), Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, U.A.R., Yemen, and Yugoslavia. Observers attended from Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador. Many of these countries attended the Bandung Conference while others, especially the new African states, were not even independent at the time of the earlier conference. In addition, many of the same leaders present at

⁶³Ibid., pp. 104-106.

⁶⁴J. W. Burton, "Introduction to Nonalignment," in Nonalignment, ed. by J. W. Burton (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1966), pp. 19-21.

Bandung also attended the Belgrade Conference. These included U Nu of Burma, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and of course, Nehru, Nasser, and Sukarno.⁶⁵ This continuity of charismatic leaders did much to popularize the policy of nonalignment and gave it an importance it perhaps did not intrinsically deserve.

On August 31, the day before the conference was scheduled to begin, the Soviet Union announced its intention to break the moratorium on atmospheric nuclear testing. This was obviously a deliberate slap in the face of Tito and the whole policy of nonalignment. In spite of the fact that this announcement changed the whole complexion of the conference, Tito failed to even mention it in his opening address. Other leaders, while mentioning it, failed to condemn it in the strong terms one might have expected. For example, Nehru only stated that he "deeply regretted" the Soviet decision. Tito, in an address delivered on September 3, first attacked France for failing to comply with the resolutions of the UN concerning discontinuance of nuclear tests. He then noted that, "The matters have now reached a point where the Soviet government has published a statement on the resumption of nuclear weapons tests."⁶⁶ Elsewhere, he

⁶⁵The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (Belgrade: Publicisticko-Izdavacki Zavod, 1961), p. 265.

⁶⁶"The Speech Delivered by Josip Broz Tito," in Belgrade Conference, p. 156.

states that the Soviet decision is understandable but he questioned the timing of the announcement. There was no censure or rebuke of any kind! This position lost Tito many friends in the West and brought into question the impartiality of the policy of nonalignment. Even such a Tito supporter as Rubinstein states, "By his equivocation Tito, the father of nonalignment, dealt his creation, at its moment of maturation, a blow from which it never recovered."⁶⁷

In their speeches and declarations, the delegates discussed familiar themes such as colonialism and neocolonialism, disarmament and the arms race, and economic development and cooperation. Although the official Belgrade Declaration stressed all three themes, there was a dispute between the Asian and African delegates over what the main source of discord was in the world. The Africans, whose main spokesman was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, stressed colonialism in all its forms. In his speech Nkrumah stated, "I have stressed over and over again that colonialism is a fundamental cause of war."⁶⁸ Nehru stated the Asian position. "First things must come first, and nothing is more important or has more priority than the world situation of war and peace."⁶⁹ Having stated this, Nehru revealed a realism

⁶⁷Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, p. 108.

⁶⁸"The Speech Delivered by Kwame Nkrumah," in Belgrade Conference, p. 103.

⁶⁹"The Speech Delivered by Jawaharlal Nehru," in Belgrade Conference, p. 108.

lacking in most of the other delegations including Yugoslavia. He warns that the nonaligned states "must not overestimate our own importance" and that "numbers alone do not create a force." Unfortunately, this advice fell on deaf ears.

As a result of the presence of the new African leaders in what might be called their first public appearance, the Belgrade Declaration dealt at length on colonialism. It pledged support for liberation and independence movements throughout the world and condemned the apartheid policy of South Africa and the Portuguese repression in Africa. The Declaration condemned the stationing of French troops in Tunisia and welcomed the Algerian delegate, Prime Minister Ben Khedda of the Provisional Government, as the rightful representative of Algeria. On September 5th, the delegation from the Congo arrived headed by Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula and Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga. The Declaration stated support for the present Congolese government and opposition to Moïse Tshombe. This was also Yugoslavia's position on the Congo question.⁷⁰

The Declaration demands that every effort should be made to decrease the widening economic gap between the few rich nations and the many poor ones. It also states that countries receiving aid should be able to determine the use of that aid as they see fit. The Declaration recommends

⁷⁰"Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries," in Belgrade Conference, pp. 253-261.

the convening of a conference of underdeveloped nations to discuss their common problems. Such a conference was actually held in Cairo from July 8 to 19, 1962.

The Declaration states that disarmament is one of the most urgent tasks of mankind. The Declaration calls for not only a ban on nuclear tests but the elimination of all armed forces and armaments. Point eighteen of the Declaration calls for the presence of nonaligned countries at disarmament talks and that all disarmament discussions be held under the auspices of the United Nations. This point did have a practical effect as the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations added eight representatives from non-nuclear Third World states to its membership. Point nineteen of the Declaration urged that an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear tests should be immediately concluded. Some observers feel that the favorable influence of the Belgrade Conference aided in the adoption of the limited test ban treaty of August 1963.⁷¹

In a separate document entitled "Statement on the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace," the delegates plead particularly to the United States and to the Soviet Union to cease their preparations for war and to seek peaceful negotiations as the means of resolving disputes. Accordingly, the delegates drafted an identical letter to John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, and to Nikita

⁷¹Ljubomir Radovanovic, The Yugoslav Views on Disarmament (Belgrade: Medunarodna Politika, 1964), pp. 3-19.

Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. The letter states that the countries attending the Belgrade Conference fear the outbreak of nuclear war which would threaten the very existence of mankind. The two states are urged to negotiate for peace rather than prepare for war.

The dual letter was carried to Washington and Moscow by special representatives, Sukarno and Keito to Washington and Nehru and Nkrumah to Moscow. Both states accepted the unsolicited advice without fanfare. The Soviet Union had previously shown its disregard for nonalignment by the timing of its nuclear test announcement. The United States was angered over the lack of a response to this announcement and the lack of impartiality by the nonaligned countries. As one observer notes, "Bandung proved nonalignment existed, Belgrade did not prove that it will be listened to."⁷²

In spite of the apparent lack of effect of the first Nonaligned Conference, Tito and others looked upon it as a success and called for continued activity and cooperation among the nonaligned. Tito viewed with alarm the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Sino-Indian border war in the same year. Accordingly, in May of 1963 he persuaded Nasser to jointly call for another conference of nonaligned countries. After a preliminary meeting in January 1964 in

⁷²Richard Gott, "The Decline of Neutralism: The Belgrade Conference and After," Survey of International Affairs 1961, 1965, p. 387.

Colombo, the conference was held in Cairo from October 5 to 10, 1964. The international situation was rather stable at this time and there were definite signs that the blocs were becoming less cohesive.

The Second Conference of Nonaligned States was attended by a throng of forty-seven countries and ten additional countries, mainly Latin American, attending as observers. This large number of countries was one of the sources of discord at the Cairo Conference. Tito, of course, still hailed the conference as a success but there was evidence of much disagreement over the direction the movement was to take. This disagreement reflected the advent of Communist China into the Third World. In order to understand this impact, we must briefly look at Chinese-Yugoslav relations.

In the early years the Chinese position mirrored that of the Soviets. When the Chinese Communists won control of the mainland in 1949, they did not establish relations with Yugoslavia because of Tito's ouster from the Cominform in 1948. Following Stalin's death in 1953, the Chinese followed Khrushchev's lead in restoring friendly relations with Yugoslavia. Diplomatic relations between China and Yugoslavia were established in January 1955. However, following incidents in Poland and Hungary in 1956, the Chinese leaders took an increasingly doctrinaire position on foreign policy matters. At a conference called in November 1957 in Moscow in order to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the

Russian Revolution, the Chinese won a tactical victory over the Yugoslavs. They succeeded in persuading the Russians to insist on reaffirmation of subordination to Moscow and the CPSU. When Tito refused to sign the resulting Declaration of Unity containing this provision, Yugoslav relations with both Moscow and Peking deteriorated. All invited communist parties boycotted the Seventh Congress of the LYC in April 1958 because of the alleged heresies in the Yugoslav program. The Chinese Ambassador in Belgrade and the Yugoslav Ambassador in Peking both left their posts not to return for twelve years. The Chinese outdid the Russians in their vehement criticism of Tito's "revisionist clique." The Chinese stated that the 1948 ouster from the Cominform was "basically correct."⁷³

In April 1960 a violent attack on Tito and his followers appeared in Red Flag, the Chinese theoretical journal. The article ridiculed "peaceful coexistence" as inferior to "people's revolution" which should be carried out throughout the world. Of course, this and similar attacks were made on Yugoslavia but the real intention was to criticize Khrushchev. In September 1963 an article entitled "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" appeared in Red Flag. It was a vehement denunciation of Titoism and accused Tito of "serving American imperialism." Reminiscent of the 1948 Cominform Declaration, the article called on the Yugoslav people to

⁷³Milorad M. Drachkovitch, "Yugoslavia," in The Communist States at the Crossroads, ed. by Adam Bromke (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 179-198.

rise up and overthrow their leaders. The Chinese have remained critical of Titoism as a program even though relations with the state of Yugoslavia have improved. Of course, the Sino-Soviet dispute has deepened and come out in the open since the early 60's. This has had the ironic effect of bettering Yugoslav-Soviet relations.⁷⁴

One of the main areas of tension between Red China Yugoslavia was and is the Third World. In the early sixties the Chinese made an active effort to achieve influence in the Third World. Their chief spokesman in this endeavor became President Sukarno of Indonesia. Sukarno came into direct conflict with Tito over the advisability of calling a second Conference of Nonaligned States. Sukarno wanted to call a second Bandung, a conference of Afro-Asian states which would exclude Yugoslavia on a geographical and racial basis. A preparatory meeting was held in Jakarta in April 1964 and it was agreed to hold a strictly Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers in June 1965.

Meanwhile, Tito and Sukarno carried on their debate at the Cairo Conference. Following Peking's line, Sukarno questioned the viability of peaceful coexistence when the world was dominated by imperialism, colonialism, and racial discrimination. Only when these evils were eliminated by active confrontation with the West could a policy of peaceful coexistence be established. Tito countered by criticizing

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 179-198.

those who accept peaceful coexistence between the super powers but who advocate a general conflagration in the Third World. Although the final declaration smoothed over the differences with the usual rhetoric, it was obvious that serious differences existed at the Cairo Conference.⁷⁵

The projected Conference of Afro-Asian states never did take place. The overthrow of Ben Bella right before the scheduled conference forced its postponement to November 1965. Then the KPI, the Indonesian Communist Party, attempted a coup on September 30, 1965 with Sukarno's encouragement. When the Indonesian military harshly put down the coup and slowly ousted Sukarno, Peking's influence began to wane in the Third World. The second Bandung was postponed indefinitely following the revolts in Algeria and Indonesia.⁷⁶

Peking did join with Cuba in convening a Tri-Continental Conference in Havana in January 1966. This conference brought together a mixture of about sixty leftist movements and organizations not necessarily representing their respective countries. Although the Soviet Union participated, Yugoslav observers were barred from the conference. Peking and Cuba condemned Yugoslavia for being against armed revolutionary struggle and for appeasing the Americans with their policy

⁷⁵Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, pp. 299-303.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 303-307.

of peaceful coexistence. This insignificant conference signalled the decline of Peking's influence in the Third World. The downfall of Ben Bella, Sukarno, and Nkrumah made many new states leery of friendly relations with Peking.

It is interesting to hear recent Chinese declarations at the United Nations declaring Communist China a nonaligned country between the two super powers. Apparently, Peking is making another drive for influence in the Third World. Although Chinese-Yugoslav relations have improved recently as witnessed by the exchange of ambassadors for the first time in twelve years in May 1970, the possibility of conflict over influence in the Third World is still real. A Yugoslav writer seemed to foresee such a conflict when he wrote, "Although she is factually 'non-aligned' in relation to the blocs and superpowers--she does not belong among the nonaligned countries."⁷⁷

Following the waning of Chinese influence in the Third World, Tito pressed for a third Conference of Nonaligned Countries. At first the reaction to this idea was not favorable. However, Tito did influence fifty-one nonaligned countries to meet in Belgrade between July 8 and July 12, 1969 to consult on the possibility of a third Nonaligned Conference. The representatives did agree on the desirability of such a conference but a date was not set and plans remained

⁷⁷Ranko Petkovic, "The Non-Aligned and China," Review of International Affairs, October 5, 1970, p. 4.

vague. On largely Tito's initiative, a preparatory meeting was held in Dar-es-Salaam from April 13 to 17, 1970. Here, final plans were made for the upcoming conference. The agenda was discussed and it was decided to invite countries upon the same basis as laid down in the Cairo Preparatory Conference in 1961.⁷⁸

The third Conference of Nonaligned States was held at Lusaka, Zambia from September 8 to 10, 1970. It was attended by representatives of fifty-four states and observers from nine other states and representatives from eight liberation movements. Reflecting the rapid pace of decolonialization, thirty-four of the fifty-four countries attending were African. Many states such as Egypt, Algeria, Cuba, Ghana, Kenya, and others were represented at the conference by Foreign Ministers or other lesser officials rather than by heads of state. This may have reflected the less than rabid enthusiasm for the conference. However, many of the stars of nonalignment did appear including Tito, Premier Bandaranaike of Ceylon, Haile Selassie, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and Archbishop Makarios.⁷⁹

As the conference itself proceeded, it was obvious that the face of nonalignment had darkened considerably. The African states dominated by the sheer weight of their

⁷⁸"Final Communique of the Preparatory Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries," Review of International Affairs, August, 1970, p. 31.

⁷⁹"Third Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Lusaka," Review of International Affairs, September 20, 1970, pp. 11-35.

reportedly received the largest applause of anyone at the conference. On the Middle East, the conference called for Israel to withdraw to pre-1967 positions and recommended sanctions if Israel did not comply. The delegates also called for the recognition of the rights of the Palestinians.⁸¹

On his return to Yugoslavia, President Tito praised the results of the conference saying it exceeded all expectations. He especially remarked on the degree of unity achieved on such questions as colonialism and neocolonialism, racial discrimination, economic development, disarmament, and peace. He also praised the united stand taken against the presence of foreign troops in Southeast Asia, the stand against Israel's aggression in the Middle East, and the support for liberation movements in Southern Africa. Realizing of course, that the positions taken were almost diametrically opposed to the position of the United States and the West, Tito took pains to assure the West of his continued impartiality. Twice in his speech he stated, "It was not directed against either of the great powers or any other countries, as some have maintained."⁸²

This conference has had about as much influence as previous conferences, that is, little or nothing. Merely

⁸¹"Third Conference," Review of International Affairs, September 20, 1970, pp. 11-35.

⁸²"Unity and Solidarity, Statement by President Tito upon His Return from Lusaka, Sept. 12, 1970," Review of International Affairs, September 20, 1970, p. 36.

numbers. The central issue of the conference and the principal area of agreement was strong objection to the continued rule of white minorities in Southern Africa. Realizing this, President Tito, the father of nonalignment, was content to remain in the background and let President Kaunda of the host country Zambia bask in the limelight.⁸⁰

The conference issued two declarations and fifteen resolutions. They covered the familiar themes of nonalignment but the statements against colonialism and the attention paid to economic development dominated the written declarations and the speeches. On specific crises areas, the conference dwelt on Southern Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Concerning Southern Africa, the conference declared its condemnation of apartheid and vowed to aid liberation movements in areas still controlled by Portugal. All countries trading with these lands and Rhodesia were condemned and sanctions were recommended against them. On Southeast Asia, the conference recommended the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Southeast Asia. They condemned the Lon Nol regime and called for the restoration of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia. They also called for a negotiated settlement for Vietnam. The delegates elected to admit Mme Nguyen The Binh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Vietnam Provisional Government (Viet Cong). She

⁸⁰Marvine Howe, "Unaligned Find Common Cause in Africa," New York Times, September 13, 1970, sec. 4, p. 2.

to meet together and agree on the desirability of peace and the evils of colonialism and racial discrimination does not accomplish anything. In fact, as regards South Africa, even the Organization of African Unity, which is hardly that, has disagreed over the issue of how to deal with the Republic of South Africa. These repeated conferences and summit meetings, as much as Tito may enjoy them, have proved unsuccessful in solving actual world problems. Prime Minister Nehru spoke the truth when he voiced this fear at the Belgrade Conference. "On the other hand, a fear creeps in upon my mind that we may not be able to get out of the rut of meeting together, passing long resolutions and making brave declarations, and then going home and allowing the world to drift to disaster."⁸³

Related to the inadequacy of these conferences is the general failure of the nonaligned states to prevent wars and aggression even within their own ranks. The failure of the nonaligned states to condemn Chinese aggression against India in 1962 and their failure to prevent the conflict made India realize that moral pressure is no substitute for adequate defense. Although Yugoslavia and the rest of the nonaligned world were staunchly behind Egypt in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, their support did not prevent the war from happening nor did it prevent Egypt from absorbing a sound defeat. The specter of one small country defeating

⁸³"The Speech Delivered by Jawaharlal Nehru," in Belgrade Conference, pp. 109-110.

another, while the big powers merely played referee, really brought into the question the efficacy of nonalignment. Similarly, the nonaligned states have been unable to stop the Vietnam war nor the present India-Pakistan conflict.

In addition to having little or no practical influence, many of the nonaligned countries have practiced the very brand of power politics they piously condemn when practiced by the super powers. A glaring example is the overt intervention by Egypt in Yemen in the middle sixties. Another example is Indonesia's aggression in Borneo and another is India's take over of Goa. These countries have apparently felt no contradiction in these actions and Yugoslavia has supported them. It is little wonder that the superpowers, both East and West, receive these countless exhortations for peace and nonaggression with more than a little skepticism. Recently, Yugoslavia expressed the opinion that the Bangla Desh movement is "clearly a national liberation struggle" and not a civil war. They favor the liberation and independence of Bangla Desh.⁸⁴ It would be interesting to note Yugoslavia's reaction to a free Croatia movement for example. Such a situation is not that improbable.

One of the many resolutions of the Lusaka Conference and an issue which was given a great deal of attention is strengthening the United Nations. The nonaligned and particularly Yugoslavia have always felt strongly about the

⁸⁴J. A. Naik, "The Why and What of the Bangla Desh Movement," Review of International Affairs, June 5, 1971, pp. 18-19.

United Nations. It is one of the few areas in which the nonaligned have been relatively successful although the success of the UN itself is open to debate. In the absence of military alliances, the UN could and should be a protector of the independence and integrity of smaller nations. Yugoslavia in particular feels that the support given them in the UN in 1951 when they brought a complaint forward against the Soviet Union was instrumental in protecting their independence.

One of the first areas in which the nonaligned undertook action more or less as a group was the issue of decolonialization. In fact, one writer states unequivocally that to the nonaligned in the UN, "The principle function-and the most urgent one-is to rid the world of the last vestiges of Western colonialism."⁸⁵ Yugoslavia has long championed this goal and was a charter member of the Special Committee on Colonialism established in 1961. Even though the pace of decolonization has been very rapid and is almost complete, the continued Portuguese holdings in Africa have kept the issue alive. Despite repeated pronouncements against intervention, Yugoslavia justifies intervention in these areas in support of liberation movements. This is because the fight against colonialism is supreme and outweighs any convictions or laws against intervention.

⁸⁵Francis O. Wilcox, "The Nonaligned States and the United Nations," in Neutrality and Nonalignment, ed. by Martin, p. 126.-

The Yugoslavs have long been in favor of and a participant in the UN's peacekeeping role. Yugoslavia supported the "Uniting for Peace" resolution in 1950 which authorized the General Assembly to consider the use of armed force to secure the peace. Yugoslavia participated in the United Nations Emergency Force created during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It was the first and is still the only communist country to participate in a UN peacekeeping role. Yugoslavia has even paid its assessed share of the costs which is rather unusual for all states. Yugoslavia contributed personnel to the United Nations Operation in the Congo in 1960 but withdrew her personnel in December because it objected to the direction the UN was taking in the Congo. Nevertheless, after a period of indecision, Yugoslavia announced that it would pay its share of the costs. However, Yugoslavia has been inconsistent here as well. Although generally favoring the UN as a peacekeeping force rather than one of the superpowers, Yugoslavia has opposed UN intervention when it would go against practical political considerations of Yugoslavia. For example, Yugoslavia opposed efforts to place a UN presence in Yemen during the "Civil War" there from 1964 to 1967.⁸⁶

Yugoslavia has consistently stood for universality of membership in the UN. She was in favor of admitting Red China even when that state was making its most vituperative

⁸⁶Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, pp. 138-150.

attacks on the "renegade Tito clique." Yugoslavia has also called for an increased role for the nonaligned nations in the Secretariat and in the UN in general. Yugoslavia was in the forefront of the fight for increased membership in the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council which was successful in 1964. Yugoslavia and the rest of the nonaligned countries present at the Belgrade Conference made clear their distaste for the troika system proposed by Khrushchev. Accordingly, Yugoslavia was in the forefront of the compromise that saw U Thant emerge as the Secretary General.⁸⁷

As the number of nonaligned countries has grown, increasing importance has been placed on economic development and the main forum for this objective has been the UN. Yugoslavia has long been in favor of multilateral aid through the UN rather than bilateral programs because it states that bilateral aid leads to economic and political dependence and involvement in the bloc structure of the world. Yugoslavia was active in the proposal leading to the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) although other sources, specifically India, provided most of the initiative. Yugoslavia was elected to the Economic and Social Council in October 27, 1952. The significance of these early moves was that they brought Yugoslavia into the ranks of the Afro-Asian states.

⁸⁷Ibid., pp. 151-158.

In the late fifties, Yugoslavia put increasing emphasis on international trade as one of the primary obstacles to economic development. Yugoslavia was thinking in terms of her own development as well as she found herself outside both the Common Market and COMECON. The Belgrade Declaration set in motion proposals which led to the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva in March 1964. One Yugoslav success was being included as one of the "77" Less Developed Countries (LDC'S). Yugoslavia generally pursued a moderate course in these proceedings realizing that the rich countries can not be forced to aid the poorer ones. Although the second UNCTAD was less than a success, the resolutions emanating from Lusaka and from Yugoslavia look forward with great enthusiasm to the third UNCTAD scheduled for 1972.⁸⁸

⁸⁸Ibid., pp. 159-183.

CHAPTER V

NONALIGNMENT'S IMPACT ON YUGOSLAVIA

It was stated earlier that the most important reasons for any country to choose a policy of nonalignment were particular concerns of the individual nation state. These concerns were and are both strategic and economic. We have seen that the policy of nonalignment as an international movement has been something less than a success. However, if the policy of nonalignment has served the national interests of Yugoslavia as a particular nation state, then we must consider it a success from a Yugoslav point of view. Let us briefly examine how the policy of nonalignment has served the needs of Yugoslavia.

First and foremost, we should consider the question of Yugoslav security and independence. The policy of nonalignment has served to maintain Yugoslavia's political independence in the world. Yugoslavia remains neither a member of the Western military bloc nor of the Soviet military bloc. Maintaining this degree of independence has not been easy considering the many explosive issues in the world during the last twenty years and Yugoslavia's geographical proximity to the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union. Relations with the Soviet Union have been the key to Yugoslavia's remaining nonaligned and independent.

The policy of nonalignment has been successful in maintaining Yugoslavia's independence from the Soviet Union. Relations with the Soviet Union have swung like a pendulum between friendliness and hostility since 1948, although the friendliness never matched the closeness of the 1945-48 period nor did the hostility match that of 1948-53. It is apparent that the Soviet Union values good relations with Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia feels the same way. Yugoslavia's present leadership would probably prefer good relations with the Soviet Union over good relations with the West if the choice ever had to be made. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia has criticized and opposed Soviet actions which she felt were violations of international law and proletarian internationalism.

Relations with the Soviet Union began to improve after Stalin's death in March 1953. Ambassadors were exchanged in June 1953 for the first time since 1948, although diplomatic relations had never been completely broken. Economic agreements were made in October 1954 and in January 1955. Although Tito and other Yugoslavs certainly welcomed this trend toward normalization, they remained skeptical and continued their close relations with the West. You will recall that the Balkan Pact was signed in August 1954. Then, Khrushchev dropped a bombshell when he announced that a Soviet delegation headed by him, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Gromyko intended to visit Yugoslavia in May 1955.

This was Khrushchev's first real appearance on the international scene and the visit didn't always go well. The mere fact that the Russians went to Belgrade, home of the heretic Tito, was a great victory for Tito. Khrushchev arrived at Belgrade Airport on May 26, 1955 and, in a speech given at the airport, blamed Beria, Abakumov, and others for the rift in 1948. Tito and the Yugoslavs met this with silence knowing that Stalin himself was responsible. Khrushchev was furious. Even years later in Khrushchev Remembers, he states that he was "somewhat disappointed" by the "cool reception" at the airport.

Khrushchev attempted to heal the breach by strengthening inter-party relationships and stressing the role of their respective communist parties in building socialism. The Yugoslavs would not go that far and insisted on stressing only governmental relations. In fact, the Belgrade Declaration issued at the close of the conference made no reference to inter-party relations. The statements in this declaration reflected a clear victory for Tito and his policies. In particular it states, "Questions of internal organization, or difference in social systems and of different forms of Socialist development, are solely the concern of the individual countries." This obviously condones Tito's separate road to socialism. Another clause states, "The recognition that the policy of military blocs increases international tension, undermines confidence among nations

and augments the danger of war."⁸⁹ This was and is a main strand of Yugoslav foreign policy. However, it was a curious statement for the Russians to make. The Warsaw Treaty establishing the Warsaw Pact had just been signed on May 14, 1955. Yugoslavia has never joined the Warsaw Pact.

This was the nature of the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. It was rather short lived however. The first international occurrence to strain the relationship was the Hungarian revolution in October 1956. Tito, in a speech at Pula, took the position that the first Soviet intervention was wrong and unjustified because socialism was still in control in Hungary. Tito did reluctantly agree that the second intervention by Soviet troops was justified because the revolution had become anti-socialist in character. The Russians of course reacted angrily and Yugoslav-Soviet relations were once again at a low ebb.

The Russians blamed the influence of Titoism for their troubles in Eastern Europe. We have already mentioned the boycott of the eighth LYC Congress in April 1958 by the Soviet bloc. We have also mentioned the Yugoslav refusal to endorse Soviet hegemony at various high level communist meetings. By the early sixties however, the antagonism had largely run its course and increasing Chinese pressure had brought the two countries closer together. A sign of this was a new

⁸⁹"Joint Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration, Belgrade, June 2, 1955," in The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, ed. by Bass and Marbury, pp. 55-60.

five year trade agreement made in 1961.

Relations between the two states remained more or less cordial throughout the sixties until the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Yugoslav reaction was unanimously against the blatant Soviet invasion and its so called justification, the Brezhnev Doctrine. The reaction to the intervention came from Tito himself, the government, and the party. A typical reaction is the Resolution adopted by the Tenth Session of the Central Committee of the LYC on August 23, 1968. It stated categorically that the, "Various nationalities express their deep indignation and protest against the occupation of Czechoslovakia."⁹⁰

The Soviet rationale for the intervention, the Brezhnev Doctrine, received a similiar response in Yugoslavia. The Brezhnev Doctrine justifies intervention in the socialist states of Eastern Europe at any time the interests of the working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party, are threatened. The sole judge of when this is the case, is, of course, the Soviet Union. This goes directly against the Belgrade Declaration of 1955 which we have already cited. Thus, the Yugoslav reaction to this doctrine was unanimously critical. A noted Yugoslav jurist stated, "Our analysis so far has shown that there is no written or unwritten international law that would permit the intervention of

⁹⁰"Yugoslavia's Attitude on the Aggression on Czechoslovakia," Review of International Affairs, September 5, 1968, p. 14.

the Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia."⁹¹

Relations with the Soviet Union then returned to a familiar pattern; correct at the governmental level, frigid at the party level, and hostile in propaganda exchanges. Yugoslav relations with the United States have generally varied in reverse to the particular state of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. For example, American contacts with Yugoslavia in the wake of this recent dispute with the Soviet Union increased enormously. Beginning in 1968, the following U.S. officials paid visits to Yugoslavia: Nicholas Katzenbach, Joseph Sisco, Frank Shakespeare, the crew of Apollo 11, Morris Stance, G. Warren Nutter, and finally culminating in President Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia from September 30 to October 2, 1970. Nixon and Tito expressed their mutual regard for each other and their respective countries while acknowledging their differences. The visit was generally considered to be enormously successful by both sides.⁹²

In order to increase Russian influence and to counter increasing American influence in Yugoslavia, Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist Party head, paid a visit to Yugoslavia from September 22 to the 25th, 1971. A new five year trade agreement calling for the exchange of 2.6 billion dollars worth of goods had been signed earlier in the year. The

⁹¹Vojin Dimitrijevic, "Intervention and Aggression," Review of International Affairs, December 5, 1968, p. 25.

⁹²"The Chronology of American-Yugoslav Relations," Review of International Affairs, October 20, 1971, pp. 1-3.

Yugoslavs wanted Mr. Brezhnev to reaffirm the Belgrade Declaration of 1955 and, by implication, reject the doctrine bearing his name. The Yugoslavs seemed to have gotten what they wanted. A communiqué issued at the end of the visit stated, "Methods of building socialism are the concern of the peoples and working class in individual countries and should not be a matter of mutual aggression."⁹³

In keeping with this increased political activity, President Tito visited the United States from October 28 to November 2, 1971. The visit was described by Tito as "very successful and usefull." A joint statement states that, "President Nixon reaffirmed the interest of the United States in the independence and nonaligned position and policy of Yugoslavia." The two leaders stated their desire to cooperate fully in the search for peace and for the equitable settlement of international disputes.⁹⁴

Nothing illustrates more clearly the Yugoslav way of playing the big powers of against each other as these recent visits since 1968. The policy of nonalignment is often described as a policy of independence and, in that respect, nonalignment has certainly succeeded. Yugoslavia condemned the United States presence in Southeast Asia throughout

⁹³"Joint Yugoslav-Soviet Statement," Review of International Affairs, October 5, 1971, p. 12.

⁹⁴"Visit of the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, to the United States of America October 28-November 2, 1971," Yugoslav Facts and Views, November, 1971, pp. 1-30.

the sixties, and at the same time vigorously criticized the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Yet cordial visits are exchanged with both and trade continues with both countries. The policy of nonalignment as a policy of independence has allowed Yugoslavia to play an unique role in international affairs and to maintain her independence in a vulnerable, strategic area of the world.

However, one area in which the policy of nonaligned Yugoslavia has not proved particularly effective is in solving her nationality problems. We noted in an earlier chapter that one of the appeals of nonalignment to underdeveloped countries was that such a policy would tend to unify an ethnically diverse state. Nonalignment has not done this for Yugoslavia but I doubt if either an alignment with the West or with the East would have had any different result.

Nationality rivalries, particularly Serbian-Croatian rivalry, have a long history in Yugoslavia. Briefly, Serbians were and are Eastern Orthodox while the Croats are Roman Catholic. They speak the same language but write in different scripts. They fought a bitter civil war during World War II in addition to that waged by the Partisans and the Chetniks. Now, there is some feeling that the Serbians dominate the LYC. This has some basis as 51.7 per cent of the LYC are Serbians whereas the next highest nationality is the Croats making up 18.13 per cent of the LYC. Also, there is an economic aspect involved. The official line

supported by Serbia and the underdeveloped republics of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina favor more economic centralization so that they can get more investment in their republics. Croatia and Slovenia favor decentralization because they want to retain their capital for their own use and not see it invested in other republics. In the face of these deep and complex antagonisms, it is doubtful whether any foreign policy would make any difference. However, it would appear that recognition of the fact that any disintegration into smaller states would leave each extremely vulnerable would do much to keep Yugoslavia intact even if at a less unified level.⁹⁵

The policy of nonaligned Yugoslavia has also served to give her a prestige and an ideological impact far above that normally allotted to a small undeveloped country. President Nixon noted this when, after commenting on the large number of world leaders President Tito has personally met, stated, "This means that one who is so fortunate to have the opportunity to talk to him is able to talk to one who is as well informed, if not better informed, than any world leader in all the world today. This tells us something about both the man and his country."⁹⁶

In addition, the policy of nonalignment has allowed

⁹⁵Wayne S. Vucinich, "Nationalism and Communism," in Contemporary Yugoslavia, ed. by Wayne S. Vucinich, pp. 236-284.

⁹⁶"Tito's Visit to the U.S.," Yugoslav Facts and Views, November, 1971, p. 5.

Yugoslavia to liberalize internally and make imaginative political and economic innovations while still retaining or claiming to retain a socialist structure. This has served to satisfy both hard line communists and more liberal members of Yugoslavia. However, the new generation no longer shares the emotional and ideological ties to Moscow that Tito, Kardelj, and some of the older communists still do. Thus, they may question a policy of nonalignment if it does not realistically serve specific Yugoslav needs in the future.

Finally, one of the main reasons Yugoslavia undertook a policy of nonalignment was economic. Finding herself outside of COMECON and not wanting to join the EEC for ideological reasons, Yugoslavia turned to the Third World as an economic partner. For the most part the results have been disappointing. Her biggest trading partner in the Third World is India with one hundred million dollars worth of trade in 1967. However, trade with the Third World never reached as much as eighteen per cent of Yugoslav exports or fifteen per cent of imports. In 1970 for example, the developing countries accounted for 11.3 per cent of Yugoslav imports and only 10.4 per cent of Yugoslav exports. Basically, the developing countries do not produce the capital goods and manufactured items needed by Yugoslavia who has to develop herself. Also, the developing nations naturally trade with their former metropole where trade

activities are already organized and established. However, Yugoslav Federal Secretary for Foreign Trade Hadzic has expressed interest in increasing trade with developing nations even to the point of possible trade preferences to developing countries.⁹⁷

Another aspect is Yugoslavia's aid to developing countries. For the most part, this aid has taken the form of credits and technical advice. Yugoslavia has extended over 750 million dollars in credit over the years to developing countries. The usual credit arrangement for this is three per cent over a period of seven years. Also, in any given year several thousand Yugoslav engineers and technicians are in developing countries aiding in internal projects. Of course this aid, though appreciated, can only be a very small percentage of the needs of the developing states. For Yugoslavia, the advantages sought and those gained are mainly political.

The other effects of nonalignment on Yugoslavia's economy are less easily seen. The Yugoslav economy, while growing substantially, is beset by several important problems. One of which is severe unemployment. Unemployment in Yugoslavia at seven per cent in 1970, down from eight per cent in 1969. However, this is a misleading figure in that it does not include the estimated one million Yugoslavs

⁹⁷Muhamed Hadzic, "Present Trends and Problems in Yugoslavia's Foreign Trade," Review of International Affairs, April 5, 1971, pp. 13-15.

working in other lands, fifty per cent of whom are in the Federal Republic of Germany. Although this is somewhat of a safety valve, many of the Yugoslavs leave permanently after acquiring a skilled trade. This is a situation Yugoslavia can ill afford. The advantages of working in the West above the fact that there are jobs include higher wages and better vocational training facilities. This large number of Yugoslavs working abroad has political implications as well. Those Yugoslavs that return to Yugoslavia inevitably compare conditions in Western Europe with those in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia comes out second best politically and economically. It is significant that of the total number of one million Yugoslavs working abroad, five hundred thousand are Croatians. Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, has recently been the scene of riots protesting the political and economic situation in Yugoslavia.⁹⁸

Another serious problem with the Yugoslav economy is the increasing balance of payments and foreign trade deficits. There was a record trade deficit in 1970 of 1.2 billion dollars, 81 per cent greater than that of 1969. The balance of payments deficit was 388 million dollars in 1970. Yugoslavia's largest single trading partner, West Germany, alone accounted for a 369 million dollar trade deficit, nearly one-third of the total deficit. Yugoslavia's

⁹⁸Aleksandar Petkovic, "Yugoslav Workers Abroad," Review of International Affairs, May 5, 1971, pp. 28-30.

top trading partners are in order: West Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States. COMECON countries only accounted for about 25 per cent of total Yugoslav foreign trade in 1970. The large trade deficit stems almost entirely from trade with Western developed countries. Exports to Yugoslavia in 1970 from Western developed states were 68.9 per cent of total Yugoslav imports. Yet Western developed states received only 56.3 per cent of Yugoslav exports in 1970.⁹⁹

Yugoslavia has tried to remedy this adverse situation. She was an observer with the OEEC and has representatives at OECD, the successor organization. It also was a member of the European Payments Union. Yugoslavia joined GATT as a full member in 1967 and is an associate member of COMECON. It was the first East European country to sign a trade agreement with the Common Market. This was a three year non preferential, non discriminatory trade agreement concluded in February 1970.¹⁰⁰

Yugoslavia has tried to play the two blocs off against each other economically as she did so well politically. It has not worked. As the statistics show, Yugoslavia's natural trade outlets are with the West. Only the West can provide

⁹⁹U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Economic Trends, Yugoslavia (American Embassy, Belgrade: May, 1971), pp. 1-8.

¹⁰⁰Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, p. 182.

the manufactured items and skilled technology that Yugoslavia herself needs to develop. Yet, she must trade with the Common Market countries on an unequal footing because she is not a member, and this accounts in large measure for her adverse trade deficit. Yet, the policy of nonalignment dictates that she remain unassociated closely with the West or the East. Yugoslavia's best position in an economic sense is to become a member of the Common Market or as closely associated with it as is possible. The policy of nonalignment by forestalling this has blinded the Yugoslavs to their own best position. The Yugoslavs may have become as dogmatically attached to nonalignment as they were to international communism before 1948, and this can only act to their detriment.

CHAPTER VI

THE FUTURE OF NONALIGNMENT

It seems clear that nonalignment as an international movement has lost much of its earlier vitality and importance. Of course, the movement may survive as sort of an international forum where Third World states may gather and exchange views on mutual problems and international relations in general. Nonalignment may exert some influence in international organizations such as the United Nations, but even there its influence is limited. The reasons for this decline in importance and influence are not difficult to ascertain.

First, we may mention the general trend to an international system of multipolarity rather than the tight bipolar system of the Cold War era. Closely aligned with this development is the lessening of bloc cohesiveness on both sides. This has led to a blurring of the definition of nonalignment. For example, is France or Romania unaligned or part of their respective blocs? Communist China has emerged as a third center of power in the world today and yet claims to be the leader of the nonaligned world. In short, nonalignment has lost much of its meaning as an antithesis to blocs when the blocs have become less well defined and less cohesive.

Another factor is the death of or the ouster of many of the charismatic leaders of the earlier period. Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno, U Nu, Nkrumah, Ben Bella, and others have all left the scene. The new class of leaders who are now in power in the Third World reflect a growing maturity and sophistication on the part of the Third World. For the most part, these leaders are more concerned with practical realistic problems such as economic development, illiteracy, poverty and hunger than with far flung decorative conferences.

We have already mentioned the lack of effectiveness of the policy of nonalignment. This, more than anything else, simply reflects the military, economic, and political weakness of the countries professing that policy. They have not been able to solve any of the major international disputes such as Vietnam, the Middle East, or the recent dispute in South Asia. They have not been able to end the racist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, one of their favorite planks. Even within the United Nations, their influence has been minimal due to their lack of economic and military power and the internal structure of that organization.

Finally, we must add the growing concern of the superpowers with detente between themselves rather than a world wide struggle for influence. There are many examples of this, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty being one of the most

significant. The continuing SALT talks and proposals for a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe and an all Europe security conference are examples of this on going activity. One of the side effects of this activity has been the relative decline in importance of the Third World. In retrospect, one must say that nonalignment was important as an international movement only as long as the superpowers considered it so.

Nonalignment as a foreign policy for Yugoslavia has likewise lost much of its effectiveness. The rationale for adopting nonalignment really no longer holds true for Yugoslavia. Nonalignment did serve to maintain Yugoslavia's political independence during the last twenty turbulent years. However, is there any longer a real danger of Yugoslavia losing her independence? I do not think so. The Soviet Union has long accepted the fact that Yugoslavia is no longer a member of the East European bloc and, realizing this fact, the Soviet Union still desires friendly relations with Yugoslavia. With a growing detente in Europe, this rationale for nonalignment seems to no longer be in effect.

The main reason Yugoslavia clings to a policy of nonalignment is the nature of her present leadership. President Tito, Kardelj and other long term members of the League of Yugoslav Communists continue to be faithful adherents to socialism to which they have devoted their entire lives. There can be no doubt as to their feelings in this regard.

However, the younger generation has not the same deep ideological ties to socialism as these do who participated in the early struggles for that cause. On the contrary, the new generation has turned more and more to the West as an example of political, economic, and cultural advancement. Moreover, it is doubtful that the next leaders of Yugoslavia will have the same penchant for international influence as President Tito obviously has. It is equally doubtful whether the new leaders will exercise the same skill at achieving this international leadership as President Tito has demonstrated. It is very likely that the successors to the present generation of Yugoslav leaders will be more Western oriented politically and economically.

Finally, the most influential reasons for closer ties with the West and an abandonment of nonalignment are economic. Yugoslavia's natural trading partners, and those of most use to her, are Western, especially the Common Market. It is often forgotten that Yugoslavia is still a rather poor and undeveloped country. Her per capita income in 1969 was only \$520. Close association with the West offers her the best road to economic development. A closer association with the Common Market would do much to reduce her crippling trade deficit. A strict interpretation of nonalignment bars these beneficial economic moves. Finally, economic prosperity and an equitable distribution of income among the different nationalities would do much to alleviate,

though not solve, the ethnic antagonisms which threaten to dismember Yugoslavia.

For the reasons mentioned above, Yugoslavia should and probably will in time, abandon the policy of nonalignment and seek membership in the Common Market and a closer association with the West in general.

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